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TEACHING LAW AND DIGITAL AGE LEGAL PRACTICE WITH AN Al
AND LAW SEMINAR
KEVIN D.ASHLEY*

INTRODUCTION
A seminar on Artificial Intelligence ("Al") and Law can teach law
students lessons about legal reasoning and legal practice in the digital
age. Al and Law is a subfield of Al/computer science research that focuses on designing computer programs-computational models-that
perform legal reasoning. These computational models are used in
building tools to assist in legal practice and pedagogy and in studying
legal reasoning in order to contribute to cognitive science and jurisprudence. Today, subject to a number of qualifications, computer programs can reason with legal rules, apply legal precedents, and even
argue like a legal advocate.
In a number of law schools, seminars on Al and Law have taught
students fundamental lessons about law and legal reasoning, including:
* logical and semantic ambiguities inherent in legal rules;
* the need to reason about legal rules as much as with them;
* the challenge of distinguishing hard from easy legal questions; and
* ways to argue with and about values underlying legal rules.
Researchers in Al and Law have learned these lessons the hard
way. As every programmer knows, to get a program to perform a task,
one needs to specify a set of steps in detail (or, with machine learning,
provide a great many annotated examples). If the program is to transform certain inputs into certain outputs, such as a legal conclusion and
an explanation, one needs to specify every step of the reasoning. In the
process, researchers need to address all of the issues law students discover, or should discover, in a legal education. For example, researchers must account for students' discoveries that the meanings of
* Professor of Law and Intelligent Systems, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; Senior Scientist, Learning Research and Development Center
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concepts in a legal rule often are not well specified; that it is frequently
unclear what exceptions apply to a legal rule; that the rule's very logic
may be ambiguous; that in interpreting how the rule should apply to
problems there are useful legal argument schema beyond IRAC (Issue,
Rule, Application, and Conclusion); and that some case analogies are
more effective than others.
By focusing students on the problems these issues pose for scientists attempting to computationally model legal reasoning, students
learn fundamental issues about law and legal reasoning in a new way.
As their research papers attest, Al and Law researchers habitually "go
meta"; they make processes of legal reasoning explicit that frequently
are addressed only implicitly in a legal education. They specify the
steps of the process and illustrate them with extended examples. Given
cognitive differences between humans and computers, law students
will not execute the steps in the same way as computers, but focusing
on these processes sensitizes law students to the gaps and pitfalls in
legal reasoning that the processes are meant to address. The result is
to improve law students' ability to read legal materials carefully, draft
legal documents precisely, manage legal risks rationally, and manage
information effectively.
The continuing challenge in Al and Law is to connect the computational models to the tasks that attorneys, judges, and law students actually perform-and the texts they actually use-in daily practice.
Increasingly, this challenge is being met. Computer programs are assisting immigration agents in the Netherlands to process clients in accordance with voluminous regulatory provisions while providing
inputs to regulators about how the rules could be improved based on
the performance of the program. From enormous caches of electronic
documents produced in modern lawsuits, computer programs are also
learning to select and cluster those documents most relevant to litigators' theories of the case based on litigators' labeling small sets of documents as relevant or not to the claims and defenses.
Today, with advances in e-discovery,i legal information retrieval,
semantic processing of web-based information for electronic contracting, computational models of legal argument, et cetera, the chances are
1. Pretrial discovery in lawsuits involves processing parties' requests for and access to
materials in the hands of opponents and others to reveal facts and develop evidence for trial. Ediscovery involves the collecting, exchanging, and analyzing of electronically stored information in
pretrial discovery. Large lawsuits routinely involve millions of e-documents challenging the
traditional approach of using keyword searches to retrieve documents and then manually reviewing them for relevance.
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increasing that law students will use, and even depend on, such systems in their practices. Law students are increasingly computer savvy.
They have been connected to the Internet from a tender age; they have
witnessed IBM's Jeopardy!-winning Watson program as it knifed
through millions of pages of text instantaneously and answered questions quicker and more accurately than the best human contestants.
Today's law students are prepared to believe that intelligent computers can play a more central roll in legal practice. The Al and Law seminar can channel this interest, for example, by getting them to think
through how a program like Watson might answer legal questions and
explain its answers. The seminar encourages law students to think
about processes of legal reasoning and legal practice and about how
those processes employ information. As explained below, given developments in the markets for legal services and legal employment, it is
useful for law students to think in terms of process engineering. The
seminar also teaches students something of how the new digital documents technologies work, what they can and cannot do, how to measure performance, how to evaluate claims about the technologies, and
how to be savvy consumers and users of the technologies.
This article provides a guide and examples to prepare law students for the digital age by means of an Al and Law seminar. After introducing the science of Artificial Intelligence and its application to
law, the paper presents the syllabus for an up-to-date Al and Law seminar. With the Syllabus as a framework, the paper showcases some
characteristic Al and Law programs, and illustrates the pedagogically
important lessons that Al and Law has learned about reasoning with
legal rules and cases, about legal argument and about the digital documents technologies that are becoming available, and even the norm, in
legal practice.
I.

INTRODUCING

Al AND LAW

As noted, AI is a branch of computer science research that focuses
on computationally modeling behavior commonly regarded as intelligent when performed by humans.2 A computational model of intelligent behavior is a computer program that performs or simulates the
behavior.
Al and Law researchers build computational models of legal reasoning, which are computer programs that perform or simulate legal
2. SEMANTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING (Marvin Minsky, ed., 1968).
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reasoning. If the inputs to the program are a description of a legal
problem, its outputs might include a solution to the legal problem and
an explanation. Legal problem-solving frequently requires reasoned
explanations in addition to a decision or prediction. Indeed, the argument supporting a decision may be more important than the decision;
otherwise a human user cannot judge whether to rely on the advice.
The focus on explanations and arguments is a key area where Al and
Law contributes to Al research.
Like computer programs generally, a computational model can be
described in terms of the inputs to the program, its outputs, and the
intervening steps that transform the former into the latter. The intervening set of steps (or algorithm) transforms the inputted problem
description into the outputs. In specifying an Al program's input/output (1/O) behavior, three questions are especially relevant:
1. Knowledge representation and search: How are the inputs, and
the information used to analyze them, represented in a problem
space that can be searched systematically?
2. Inference control mechanism: What governs the search for solutions in terms of efficiency and relevance?
3. Learning: In order to improve its performance, how can the
program learn from its errors and successes and from other sources
of information?3
In the case of Al and Law programs, only a few accept problems
inputted as natural language texts or reason with cases or legal rules
expressed in text. More frequently, the problems are presented in a
specialized representation, for instance, as answers to questions generated by an expert system4 or as a list of dimensions factors that appear in the problem, like stereotypical patterns of facts that strengthen
or weaken a side's claim.s Similarly, the rules in the program's
knowledge base may be represented in terms of logical expressions
and the cases, like the problem, may also be represented in terms of
factors. In discussing some representative Al and Law programs, the
focus will be on the ways in which they search systematically for solu-

3. NEIL STILLINGS, STEVEN E. WEISLER, CHRISTOPHER H. CHASE, MARK H. FEINSTEIN, JAYL. GARFIELD,
EDWINA L. RISSLAND, NEIL A. STILLINGS & STEVEN W. WEISLER, COGNITIVE SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION

140-42, 177, 192 (2d ed. 1995).
4.

DONALD A. WATERMAN & MARK A. PETERSON, MODELS OF LEGAL DECISIONMAKING 14 (1981)

("'Expert system[s] [are] computer programs that embody expertise and knowledge supplied by
human experts and that use artificial intelligence techniques to provide inferences for [users].").
5. Kevin D.Ashley, Reasoning with Cases and Hypotheticals in HYPO, 34 INT'L J.OF MAN-MACH.
STUD. 753, 763-64 (1991).
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tions and can learn, for example, how to detect factors in the texts of
cases or to classify the texts of statutory provisions.
In theory, and often in practice, an Al or Al and Law program's
problem-solving behavior can be assessed in terms of relevance and
performance measures similar to those applied to human problemsolving (such as predictive accuracy, coverage, precision, recall, and
explanatory adequacy of the outputs given the inputs). In addition, an
Al program may be subjected to a modified Turing test in which a human judge engages in an interaction with a source, asking it questions
and receiving responses. The judge, blinded as to the nature of the
source, whether human or machine, tries to determine which it iS.6
An Al and Law program's algorithm, the intervening set of steps
by which it transforms an inputted legal problem description into outputs of an explained solution, may be especially interesting from a legal
instructional viewpoint. In breaking the legal reasoning process into a
set of steps, the researcher makes explicit some aspects that are often
left implicit or unexplained in pedagogical or jurisprudential accounts.
Examples of the program's 1/O behavior illustrate the legal reasoning
model in operation, including the steps as applied in the problem context. The examples highlight both the program's successes, where the
outputs conform to the kind of intelligent behavior we expect from
attorneys, and its failures, where the outputs do not so conform. A researcher uses the trace of this stepwise process to frame the question
of how to improve the model's (legal) performance, extending the envelope of successes. The I/O examples illustrating the reasoning steps,
assumptions, successes and failures, present law students with a window on the process of legal reasoning.
II. TEACHING Al AND LAW TO LAW STUDENTS
The steps in Al and Law programs that transform inputted legal
problems into outputted explained solutions are a key reason why an
Al and Law seminar has pedagogical value. They present law students
with an opportunity to consider if, how, and how well human legal
reasoning deals with the same issues.
In observing the decomposition of the legal reasoning process into
a set of steps, students become aware of some gaps in the reasoning
process that need to be-and are-"filled" perhaps by some ad hoc
means, the details of which are left implicit, unexplained, and some6. PAMELA MCCORDUCK, MACHINES WHO THINK 70 (2d ed. 2004).

788

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:3

times unjustified. Examples of such gaps include distinguishing hard
from easy questions of law, determining what similarities and differences among cases are legally relevant, resolving conflicting rules, and
making arguments from values underlying a rule. Al and Law researchers have not filled those gaps in a sense that might satisfy a legal
or jurisprudential scholar, but they have focused on the problem of
filling the gaps and engineered processes to address them well enough
for some purposes. It is worth law students' time and effort to see how
these gaps have been filled.
Even though Al and Law research involves computational models,
generally non-technical law students with no experience of computer
programming can still improve their understanding of law by studying
the models and examples. The algorithms are described at a high level
of abstraction as either flow charts or textually described sets of steps.
The examples of the algorithms in operation are intuitively accessible examples of legal reasoning from which law students can learn.
As noted, the I/O examples of automated legal reasoning programs
illustrate both successes and failures. The failures are more interesting; students can observe how human intelligence fills in a gap and
ponder the consequences for law and for Al and Law. As a thought experiment, law students can use the trace of the stepwise process (such
as the explanation of the extended example) to participate in framing
the question of how to improve the program's (legal) performance, and
thus design a better computational model of that kind of legal reasoning.
Of course, it requires technical expertise to understand in detail
how a computational model's knowledge is represented (for example,
with logical formalisms) and how the search, inference control and
learning are implemented. Fortunately, law students do not need to
understand the technical details in order to learn from the examples of
legal reasoning as modeled.
As asserted above, a second key reason why an Al and Law seminar has pedagogical value is to help law students understand the technology of modern legal practice. Since attorneys increasingly are called
upon to assess, purchase, and rely upon products that employ machine
learning,7 data mining,8 natural language processing, and information
7. Machine Learning is the study of computer algorithms that improve automatically
through experience. TOM M. MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 1-2 (1997).
8. Id. at 17 ("Machine learning algorithms... are especially useful in ... data mining problems where large databases may contain valuable implicit regularities that can be discovered
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retrieval for use (for instance in e-discovery), it is valuable for nonprogramming law students to learn how these tools are employed and
something about how they work. E-discovery tools will soon be not
only permitted, but required by the professional standard of care and
demanded by large corporate clients.
Although techniques such as machine learning from large data
sets, data mining, or natural language processing are complex and
leave legal intuitions behind, attorneys increasingly will have to select
tools, use them or direct others in using them, interpret their outputs,
and justify to others (such as judges) their reliability and effectiveness.
For these kinds of models and software products, law students can at
least learn the conceptual vocabulary, high-level descriptions of how
the techniques work, the ways in which performance can be measured,
what the measures signify, what the models capture and what the
models leave out. The experience of thinking in terms of (1) high-level
descriptions of computational algorithms; (2) examples of where the
algorithms work and where they break down; and (3) the ways their
performance is measured will prepare students to be informed consumers of digital tools aimed at the legal profession.
During the last twenty-five years, Al and Law seminars have been
taught regularly, if not continually, in law schools at Harvard, Stanford,
Northeastern, Chicago-Kent, and Pittsburgh.9 Typically, the seminars
focus students on accessible research papers that have been published
in the field's major venues, such as the International Conference on
Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL),lo the annual conference of Legal
Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX),11 and the journal Artificial Intelligence and Law.12 The papers illustrate the 1/0 examples of
legal reasoning and the intervening steps. They also identify a gap that
often relates to a significant legal/educational challenge, one that human reasoners easily bridge, finesse or ignore, but that computational
reasoners need special techniques to address.

automatically (e.g., to analyze outcomes of medical treatments from patient databases or to learn
general rules for credit worthiness from financial databases) ... [.1") (emphasis added).
9. See infra notes 13, 17, 23, 24. Kevin Ashley has taught an Al and Law Seminar at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law since 1989.
10. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, http://www.iaail.org
(last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
11. JURIX, THE FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMs, http://www.jurix.nl (last

visited Apr. 20, 2013).

12. See ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L., available at
www.springer.com/computer/aijournal/10506.
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Sometimes, the AI and Law Seminar combines law students and
computer science graduate students who study AL. This provides law
students a pedagogically valuable opportunity to practice explaining
the law to non-law students (and for graduate students to explain
computer science to non-techies). Law students also gain experience
interacting with technically- and technologically-minded persons,
whom many law students may encounter in practice, either among
clients or vendors.
An AI and Law Practicum can take law students a few steps further, engaging them in some aspects of building, applying, or using
computational models of or for legal reasoning. Al and Law Practicums
have been offered in law schools at Stanford, Northeastern, ChicagoKent,13 and Pittsburgh, offering law students opportunities to develop
expert systems using software development tools for nonprogrammers. The practicum activities can be integrated with the Al and Law
Seminar as a kind of "lab" component or follow it in the next semester.
Students with or without programming skills can actually build components of legal expert systems, and in doing so, they will they grapple
with bridging the gaps. Even if they fail to implement a practical
bridge, they learn about the gap.
Since much of computer programming involves a design process
of successive refinement, by identifying goals and sub-goals and describing a set of steps for achieving these goals at each level, law students can engage in the higher-level design tasks even without
knowing a programming language. Law students who can think systematically about processes for solving legal programs can engage in a
stepwise decomposition of the problem and then focus on "inventing" a
technique (such as a set of steps) for solving some sub-goal. One does
not need to program the steps to learn from the process of describing
them and illustrating them with an example.
Actual programming in computer code happens only at the end of
the process, and, in any event, it may not require special skills. Increasingly, tools are available with which non-programming law students
can build solutions for real legal problems to implement their step13. At Chicago-Kent, Professor Richard Wright taught a course on "Computers and Legal
Reasoning" using SAGE: A Pedagogical Expert System Development Tool, a suite of computer
programs of his own design, which allowed the rapid, hypertext-driven building of integrated rule
bases and case bases to represent legal knowledge and model legal reasoning and, in particular,
legal domains. Professor Ron Staudt teaches a "Justice and Technology Practicum" that engages
students in building web-based tools, including expert systems, to support legal services advocates, pro bono volunteers, and pro se litigants.
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wise expert system components. Recently, in a Georgetown Law School
seminar entitled "Technology, Innovation, and Law Practice," law students built legal expert systems in a variety of domains using tools
from Neota Logic that are also used by law firms to create expert systems for professional practice.14
Law students without programming skills can also engage in designing and applying schemes for annotating legal texts (including with
argument-diagramming tools described belowls) so that they can be
used by computational models of legal reasoning or in applying machine learning to classify texts according to their legal significance. For
example, students at Hofstra Law School's Law, Logic, and Technology
Research Laboratory learn about legal reasoning as they participate in
empirical research involving close study and annotation of evidential
reasoning in legal opinions.16
III. AN Al AND LAW SEMINAR SYLLABUS

A Syllabus for an AI and Law Seminar that covers both key pedagogical points-learning lessons from stepwise decompositions of legal reasoning and understanding the new technology of legal
practice-is presented in the Appendix and described below.
A. PartOne: ComputationalModels of Reasoning with Legal Rules and
Cases
The first section of Part One of the Syllabus, Introduction to Computational Models of Legal Reasoning, includes an informative survey
and two early examples of computational models of legal problemsolving tasks of particular relevance to law students, who have all taken first year torts and contracts courses. The survey, by Edwina
Rissland, introduces law students to Artificial Intelligence, Al's application to the legal domain, and computational models of legal reasoning.17 The first example of such a model is Donald Waterman's expert
14. Press Release, Neota Logic, Inc., Georgetown Law Students Challenge Tradition by Building Online Legal Advisors with Neota Logic (Apr. 24, 2012) available at,
http://www.prweb.com/releases/neotalogic/irontechlawyer/prweb9438690.htm.
15. See infra note 40.
16. LAW, LOGIC & TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH LABORATORY, http://www.ltlab.org (last visited Apr.

23, 2013).
17. Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal
Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1957-58 (1990). The author, University of Massachusetts Professor
Emeritus of Computer Science, has regularly taught an Al and Law Seminar at Harvard Law
School. In addition to assigning readings, she strongly suggested that law students (and her grad-
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system that used heuristic rules (i.e., rules of thumb, based on expert
experience) to advise on settling product liability claims.18 The second
sample model by Anne Gardner analyzes exam problems law students
encounter in a first year contracts course.19
Each of these examples illustrates a computational machinery for
drawing legal conclusions. Rissland's survey focuses on the Waterman
and Gardner examples as well and relates them to the development of
case-based models of legal reasoning described below.
Waterman's program contained three kinds of rules derived from
legal authorities, litigators, and insurance claims adjustors: rules defining legal concepts like product liability, strict liability, and comparative
negligence; informal rules to address indefinite legal terms and account for likely juror reactions to appearance and sympathy; and rules
guiding settlement computations (for example, for computing the
amount of damages for pain and suffering). The system applied the
rules in a bottom-up direction; it repeatedly asked the user questions
based on the rules whose conditions had not yet been satisfied and
then, given answers, used the applicable rules to draw a conclusion
about how much the dispute was worth for purposes of settlement. By
way of explaining its conclusion, the program could output an inference tree, a tree of the rules that "fired" (that is, whose conditions were
satisfied) resulting in the conclusion.
Gardner's program implemented a model of offer and acceptance
as an ordered progression among four intermediate conclusions or
states: (0) no relevant legal relations, (1) a pending offer, (2) the existence of a contract, and (12) the existence of a contract plus a pending
proposal to modify the contract. Arcs represented the ways to move
from one state to another. For instance, to move: from (0) to (1) required finding an offer, from (1) to (2) required finding an acceptance
of the pending offer, and from (2) to (0) required revoking the acceptance and rejecting the offer. There were rules associated with each
uate students, of which I was one, an opportunity for which I am forever grateful) prepare a onepage summary of readings with the following major entries: 1) a brief (i.e., no more than two- or
three-sentence) description of what the work is about, 2) the strengths of the approach, 3) the
weaknesses of the approach, and 4) something about the approach that is relevant to some project, task assignment, or opinion of the student. I have always found it helpful to prepare such
summaries of readings, and I ask my students to do the same.
18. WATERMAN & PETERSON, supra note 4. Don Waterman was an Al pioneer whose disserta-

tion project modeled betting in Poker.
19. ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH To LEGAL REASONING 4

(1987). Anne Gardner is a graduate of both Stanford University's Law School and its doctoral
program in Computer Science.
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arc which defined the conditions and determined whether a condition
had been satisfied (that is, whether the facts disclosed an offer, an acceptance, a revocation, etcetera).
The Logical Models of Statutory Reasoning section includes an early program by Marek Sergot, et alia, that analyzed legal questions involving British citizenship; it still represents one of the more ambitious
efforts at making a statute "computable." This program, comprising
150 rules represented (manually) from the provisions of the British
Nationality Act, could analyze problems involving questions of nationality and explain its answers using a trace of the logical inferences it
had drawn.20
A practical problem arises in making large statutes computable:
the formal representations of the statutory rules have a tendency to
become disconnected from the statutory texts. This problem complicates explaining the system's results and maintaining a large system
where the rules need to be updated as the statutory texts are amended.
Trevor Bench-Capon and Franz Coenen developed an approach to coordinating the representations of statutory rules so that they are isomorphic to the statutory code's structure.21
Other readings in this section warn of problems when interpreting
statutory texts as logical rules. One problem is the need to deal with
logical ambiguity, caused by the indeterminate scopes of logical connectors in natural language texts.22 Another problem stems from the
fact that classical logic is monotonic; once a conclusion is drawn, it
cannot be "taken back" even in the light of new information. Thus, it
does not fit legal reasoning very well, where legal conclusions typically
can be, and are, argued one way and the other.23

20. Marek J. Sergot, Fariba Sadri, Robert A. Kowalski, Frank Kriwaczek, P. Hammond & H. T.
Cory, The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program,29 COMM. OF THE ACM 370 (1986). Marek
Sergot is a Professor of Computational Logic at Imperial College, London.
21. Trevor Bench-Capon & Franz Coenen, Exploiting Isomorphism: Development of a KBS to
Support British Coal Insurance Claims, 1991 PROC. OF THE THIRD INT'L CONF. OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 62.

22. See Layman E. Allen & C.Rudy Engholm, Normalized Legal Drafting and the Query Method, 29 J.LEGAL EDUC. 380 (1977-1978). Layman Allen, a Professor Emeritus of Law at the University of Michigan, developed a series of games about logic, mathematics, and law, including WFF 'N
PROOF, EQUATIONS, and THE LEGAL ARGUMENT GAME OF LEGAL RELATIONS.

23. Donald Berman & Carole Hafner, Obstacles to the Development of Logic-Based Models of
Legal Reasoning, in COMPUTER POWER AND LEGAL LANGUAGE 183-214 (Charles Walter ed., 1986).
Donald Berman, a former Professor of Law and co-director of the Center for Law and Computer
Science and the other co-director, Associate Professor of Computer Science Carole Hafner, regularly taught an AI and Law seminar at Northeastern University, Boston, MA.
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The Case-Based Models of Legal Reasoning and Models for Predicting Legal Outcomes sections include techniques to model alternatives
to purely rule-based, deductive models of legal reasoning. These include models for representing legal concepts more flexibly in terms of
definitional prototypes and argument-driven deformationS,24 and in
terms of dimensions that represent and partially order stereotypical
fact patterns that strengthen or weaken a claim.25 A third model,
GREBE, employs semantic networks representing facts that judges
deemed important (or criterial)in explaining their holdingS.26
These programs used cases to generate arguments for and against
proposed conclusions (such as HYPO's three-ply argumentS27), a significant departure from the reasoning of the logical deductive models.
The case-based models also focused the field on the need to develop new techniques to evaluate the computational models empirically, such as a kind of Turing test of GREBE. L. Karl Branting employed a
human expert to grade arguments generated by law students or by the
program. The grader was blinded as to the sources of the arguments
(that is, he was not warned that any argument was generated by a
computer), and the program's argument was made to look like the law
students' papers.28
The case-based models inspired factor-based approaches, CATO29
and IBP30, which predict outcomes of legal cases based on the strength
of the pro and con arguments. This revived interest in an objective
criterion for evaluating models and predictive accuracy, a recurrent
thread in AI and Law since early researchers applied a nearestneighbor approach to predicting outcomes of Canadian tax cases in-

24. See L. Thorne McCarty, An Implementation of Eisner v. Macomber, 1995 PROC. OF THE
FIFTH INT'L cONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 276. A Professor of Computer Science and Law at

Rutgers University, Thorne McCarty has taught a seminar on Artificial Intelligence and Law there
and as a visitor at Stanford Law School.
25. Ashley, supra note 5, at 763-64.
26. L.Karl Branting, Building Explanationsfrom Rules and StructuredCases, 34 INT'L . OF MANMACH. STUD. 797 (1991).

27. Ashley, supra note 5, at 764.
28. Branting, supra note 26.
29. See Vincent Aleven, Using Background Knowledge in Case-Based Legal Reasoning: A Computational Model and an Intelligent Learning Environment, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 183
(2003).
30. See Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Bruininghaus, Computer Models for Legal Prediction,46
JURIMETRICS 309 (2006).
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volving capital gains issues.31 In addition to predicting, however, CATO
and IBP added an ability to explain the predictions with arguments.
The section entitled Models Integrating Cases, Statutes, Rules, Concepts, and Values focuses on other improvements to case-based computational models. The GREBE program integrated case-based and rulebased reasoning, indexing semantic networks of criterial facts in past
cases with frequently litigated statutory concepts in workmen's compensation laW.32
Another approach to integrating cases and rules, CABARET, combined logical representations of an IRS provision governing home office deductions and dimensions with the provision's open-textured
statutory terms. The dimensions indexed positive and negative case
examples of the terms.33 Notably, CABARET employed an agenda
mechanism to switch between rule-based and case-based analyses,
generating arguments for and against the taxpayer's position.
In 1993, an influential critique changed the course of Al and Law
research on case-based computational models.34 Donald H. Berman
and Carol Hafner pointed out that the models lacked a teleological
component: the underlying purposes or values served by legal statutes
and rules-which are so much a focus of human legal interpretationwere missing. The criticism led to a decade of work, resulting in BenchCapon and Sartor's landmark model of legal reasoning with cases that
incorporated values in theories of value preferences induced from
precedents.35 Another approach focused on how case decisions extensionally define principles in professional ethics. It represented cases
with a more generalized version of semantic networks of criterial facts
in ethics decisions by "judges"' (actually engineering ethics experts).36
In an experiment, Bruce M. McLaren empirically demonstrated the
contributions to his SIROCCO program's retrieval effectiveness as cases
filled in the meanings of the abstract ethical rules.
31. See Ejan Mackaay & Pierre Robillard, Predicting judicial Decisions: The Nearest Neighbour
Rule and Visual Representation of Case Patterns, 3 DATENVERARBEITUNG IMRECHT 302 (1974).
32. Branting,supra note 26.
33. Edwina L. Rissland & David B. Skalak, CABARET: Statutory Interpretation in a Hybrid
Architecture, 34 INT'L J.OF MAN-MACH. STUD. 839 (1991).
34. Donald H. Berman & Carol Hafner, Representing Teleological Structure in Case-Based
Legal Reasoning: The Missing Link, 1993 PROC. OF THE FOURTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
& L.50.
35. Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor, A Model of Legal Reasoning with Cases Incorporating Theories and Values, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 97 (2003).
36. See Bruce M. McLaren, Extensionally Defining Principles and Cases in Ethics:An Al Model,
150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 145 (2003).
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B. PartTwo: Defeasible Legal Reasoning with Argument Schemes

Part Two introduces the current focus of Al and Law research, the
development of a unified computational framework for nonmonotonic, defeasible legal reasoning using argument schema that
incorporate and recast the logico-deductive, case-based, and valuebased approaches to assessing legal claims described above. Nonmonotonic or defeasible inference models can take back previously
inferred consequences in light of new information, an important feature of legal reasoning.
The section on Assessing Legal Claims with Argument Schema presents outlines for the unified frameworks by Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon37 and by Thomas F. Gordon and Douglas Walton3
This work also includes modeling evidentiary arguments about legal
claims and standards of proof.
Matthias Grabmair and the author developed argument schema
for case comparison with value judgments, intermediate legal concepts, and hypothetical cases as employed in U.S. Supreme Court oral
arguments.39 Vern R.Walker's model connects examples of evidentiary
reasoning in cases to decision trees that model statutory requirements.40
As argument schema improve and extend the kinds of legal arguments that programs can model, they increase the need for better ways
to represent legal fact situations and concepts. The need for flexible
conceptual schema, raised by L. Thorne McCarty41 and Rissland,42 has
become even more acute. As the author demonstrated empirically,43
intermediate legal concepts play an important role in predicting legal

37. Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon, Argumentation and Standardsof Proof 2007 PROC.
OF THE ELEVENTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 107.

38. Thomas F. Gordon & Douglas Walton, Legal Reasoning with Argumentation Schemes,
2009 PROC. OF THE TWELFTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 137.

39. Matthias Grabmair & Kevin D. Ashley, Facilitating Case Comparison Using Value Judgments and Intermediate Legal Concepts, 2011 PROC. OF THE THIRTEENTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 161; Matthias Grabmair & Kevin D.Ashley, Argumentation with ValueJudgments
- An Example of HypotheticalReasoning, 2010 PROC. OF THE 23RD ANN. CONF. ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE &

INFO. Sys. 67.
40. Vern R. Walker, Nathaniel Carie, Courtney C. DeWitt & Eric Lesh, A Framework for the
Extraction and Modeling of Fact-FindingReasoning from Legal Decisions: Lessons from the Vaccine/Injury ProjectCorpus, 19 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 291, 296-98 (2011).
41. See McCarty, supra note 24.
42. Rissland, supra note 17; Rissland & Skalak, supra note 33, at 839-40.
43. Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Bruininghaus, A Predictive Role for Intermediate Legal Concepts, 2003 PROC. OF THE SIXTEENTH ANN. CONF. ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYS.153, 155.
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outcomes. Changes in their meanings over time can be monitored,44
and argument schema invite the modeling of ever more detailed argumentation about the meanings of particular intermediate legal concepts.45
Ontologies-systematic and explicit specifications of domain concepts used in legal rules and fact situations-help a computational
model to reason flexibly with legal concepts. Ontologies also are key
for someday transitioning from computational models that reason with
cases represented in formalisms to cases represented simply as texts.
The section on Representing Legal Concepts and Case Knowledge in On-

tologies presents foundational work on legal ontologies;46 some ontological requirements for supporting analogical, teleological, and
hypothetical legal reasoning using argument schema;47 and up-to-date,
semi-automated means for constructing legal ontologies from legal
texts.48
C.PartThree: Legal Information Retrieval,Information Extraction, and
Text Processing

Part Three's section on Explaining How Full-Text Legal Information

Retrieval Works introduces students to practicalities of legal information retrieval ("IR") (as explained more fully in Section V), including
the use of inverted indices, the role of term frequency in assessing relevance, probabilistic models of retrieval49 using Bayesian networks,so

44. Edwina L. Rissland & M. Timur Friedman, Detecting Change in Legal Concepts, 1995 PROC.

OF THE FIFTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 127.

45. Grabmair & Ashley, supra note 39, at 164-66.
46. Trevor J.M. Bench-Capon & Peppin R.S. Visser, Ontologies in Legal Information Systems;
The Need for Explicit Specifications of Domain Conceptualisations, 1997 PROC. OF THE SIXTH INT'L
CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 132; Joost Breuker, Andre Valente & Radboud Winkels, Legal
Ontologies in Knowledge Engineering and Information Management, 12 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L.
241 (2004).
47. See Kevin D. Ashley, OntologicalRequirementsfor Analogical,Teleological, and Hypothet-

ical Legal Reasoning, 2009 PROC. OF THE TWELFTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 1.

48. Enrico Francesconi, Simonetta Montemagni, Wim Peters & Daniela Tiscornia, Integrating
a Bottom-Up and Top-Down Methodology for Building Semantic Resources for the Multilingual
Legal Domain, in SEMANTIC PROCESSING OF LEGAL TEXTS: WHERE THE LANGUAGE OF LAW MEETS THE LAW

OF LANGUAGE 95 (Enrico Francesconi, Simonetta Montemagni, Wim Peters & Daniela Tiscornia
eds., 2010).
49. Howard Turtle, Text Retrieval in the Legal World, 3 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 5, 5-6
(1995).
50. See Eugene Charniak, Bayesian Networks Without Tears, 12 Al MAGAZINE, Winter 1991, at
50.
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methods for evaluating legal IR and the applicable measures, precision
and recall,si and methods for extracting information from legal textS.52
The section Combining Legal IR and AI to Analyze Legal Claims examines the potentially complementary advantages and disadvantages
of full-text legal IR and Al and Law models. The section also explores
methods of combining them, including using case-based models automatically to find legally relevant passages in case opinions in the SPIRE
program,53 using legal ontologies to improve retrieval effectiveneSS,54
extracting information automatically from case law,ss and supporting
alternative legal research paradigms, such as a heuristically guided
search through networks of legal information. In SCALIR, the network
comprised legal cases are linked via shared terms or citations.56 In
BankXX, the network of legal knowledge connected annotated nodes
representing cases as sets of factors and bundles of citations, and representing exemplars of prototypical stories and legal theories as bundles of factors.57
The work in the section on Legal Information Extraction and Text
Processing connects computational models of legal reasoning and legal
texts. The SMILE+IBP program classifies textually described cases in
terms of applicable factors and then predicts and explains their outcomes using IBP.58 Other programs automatically classify statutory
texts in terms of major types, abstract categories, and subject matters
(like "Administrative Law" or "Intellectual Property Law") or norm
types (such as definition, permission, or obligation) and then extracts
information such as norm features (like duty, duty bearer, action, or
object of action) and regulatory functions (that is, functional infor-

51. David C.Blair & M. E. Maron, An Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for a Full-Text Document-Retrieval System, 28 COMM. OF THE ACM 289 (1985).
52. Peter Jackson, Khalid Al-Kofahi, Alex Tyrrell & Arun Vacher, Information Extraction from
Case Law and Retrieval of Prior Cases, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 239 (2003).
53. Jody I. Daniels & Edwina L. Rissland, Finding Legally Relevant Passages in Case Opinions,
1997 PROC. OF THE SIXTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 39.
54. M. Saravanan, B. Ravindran & S. Raman, Improving Legal Information Retrieval Using an
Ontological Framework, 17 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 101, 103 (2009).
55. Jackson et al., supra note 52.
56. Daniel E. Rose & Richard K. Belew, A Connectionist and Symbolic Hybrid for Improving
Legal Research, 35 INT'L J.OF MAN-MACH. STUD. 1 (1991).
57. Edwina Rissland, David Skalak & Timur Friedman, BankXX: Supporting Legal Arguments
through Heuristic Retrieval, 4 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 1, 5-8 (1996).
58. Kevin D.Ashley & Stefanie Brininghaus, Automatically Classifying Case Texts and Predicting Outcomes, 17 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 125, 139-40 (2009).
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mation about what entities and events a statute governs as well as the
purpose of the statute and its constraints).59
In previous AI and Law work on legal information extraction and
text processing, researchers could assume that the legal texts had a
fairly homogeneous structure and conformed to certain constraints
about content. However, those assumptions do not apply in ediscovery, in which parties to lawsuits must analyze and produce
enormous numbers of documents relevant to the allegations of the
complaint and answer. The work in the section Al and Law Tools for EDiscovery: Obtaining Evidence Relevant to Lawyers' Hypotheses about
Claims and Documents addresses these challenges.60 Given the high
volumes of documents, this is a domain where information retrieval
tools necessarily take the lead,61 but where statistical techniques and
knowledge-based models of legal claims and hypotheses can complement one another.62 Al tools may play a valuable role, such as in filtering documents using social network techniqueS,63 creating optimal
seed sets of relevant documents for predictive coding (that is, machine
learning-based classification of unseen documentS64), and supporting
attorneys in exploring documents using innovative interfaces.65
D. PartFour: The FutureofAl and Law: Bridging ComputationalModels
and Legal Texts
Part Four of the Syllabus turns to some future Al and Law work
that promises to bridge the gap between computational models of legal
reasoning and legal texts. The section Near Term Developments in Al
and Law presents some developments one can reasonably anticipate
59. Enrico Francesconi & Andrea Passerini, Automatic Classification of Provisions in Legislative Texts, 15 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 1, 2-3 (2007); Emile de Maat, Kai Krabben & Radboud
Winkels, Machine Learning Versus Knowledge Based Classification ofLegal Texts, 2010 PROC. OF THE
TWENTY-THIRD ANN. CONF. LEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYS. 87.
60. See Kevin Ashley & Will Bridewell, Emerging Al & Law Approaches to Automating Analysis
and Retrieval of Electronically Stored Information in Discovery Proceedings, 18 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE& L. 311 (2010).
61. Douglas W. Oard, Jason R Baron, Bruce Hedin, David D. Lewis & Stephen Tomlinson,
Evaluation of Information Retrievalfor E-discovery, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 347 (2010).
62. David D. Lewis, Afterword: Data, Knowledge, and E-discovery, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
& L. 481 (2010).
63. Hans Henseler, Network-based Filtering for Large Email Collections in E-Discovery, 18
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 413 (2010).
64. Christopher Hogan, Robert S. Bauer & Daniel Brassil, Automation of Legal Sensemaking in
E-discovery, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 431 (2010).
65. Caroline Privault, Jacki O'Neill, Victor Ciriza & Jean-Michel Renders, A New Tangible User
Interface for Machine Learning Document Review, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 459 (2010).
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soon. The DeepQA approach of the Jeopardy M-winning IBM Watson
program66 will likely have a profound effect on how to extract relevant
information automatically from legal decision texts. Using DeepQA
natural language processing tools to annotate argument-schematic
information in legal decision texts, a program could conceivably screen
new texts that provide evidence of legal compliance.67 Bayesian networks will be integrated with argument schema so that computational
models of legal argument can account for factual, normative, moral,
and empirical uncertainties68 more systematically than in Waterman's
settlement-guiding program.69 Defeasible logical models of regulatory
requirements will help ensure that business processes are designed to
comply with the law7o and to automate web-based agents in entering
into electronic contracts.71 The business process approach will continue to be extended to administrative agencies. In the INDiGO project of
the Dutch immigration and naturalization service, laws and regulations
are implemented in a rule engine service that immigration agents and
other users call in support of case management. The rule engine provides a list of tasks for the specific case, but end users decide on ordering the tasks. Specialized tools enable the end users to provide the rule
modelers and the regulators with feedback for continually improving
the regulations and rules.72

66. David Ferrucci, Eric Brown, Jennifer Chu-Carroll, James Fan, David Gondek, Aditya A.
Kalyanpur, Adam Lally, J. William Murdock, Eric Nyberg, John Prager, Nico Schlaefer & Chris
Welty, Building Watson: An Overview of the DeepQA Project, 31 Al MAGAZINE, Fall 2010, at 59.
67. Kevin D. Ashley & Vern R. Walker, Automated Monitoring of Legal-Rule Compliance
Using DeepQA: Screening Legal Documents for Argumentation Evidence (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
68. Matthias Grabmair & Kevin D.Ashley, A Survey of Uncertainties and their Consequences, in
Probabilistic Legal Argumentation, in BAYESIAN ARGUMENTATION 61, 61-62 (Frank Zenker ed.,
2012).
69. WATERMAN & PETERSON, supra note 4.
70. Guido Governatori & Sidney Shek, Rule Based Business Process Compliance, 874 PROC. OF
THE RULEML2012@ECAI CHALLENGE, AT THE SIXTH INT'L SYMP. ON RULES Paper No. 5 (2012), available
at http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-874/paperl7.pdf.
71. Benjamin N. Grosof, Yannis Labrou & Hoi Y. Chan, A Declarative Approach to Business
Rules in Contracts: Courteous Logic Programs in XML, 1999 PROC. OF THE FIRST ACM CONF. ON
ELECTRONIC COM.

72. Audrey Theunisz, INDiGO: Rules-driven Business Services; Flexibility Within the Boundaries of the Law, Presentation of the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Oct. 5, 2010),
available at
http://www.servicetechsymposium.com/soa-archive/pdf berlin/AudreyTheuniszRulesDriven
.pdf.In the absence of a published paper in English on INDiGO, this seems to be the most informative document publicly available.
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E. Addenda: IntelligentTutoring Systems and Ethics
Finally, the Syllabus includes two topics that could be addressed
at the end of the seminar or integrated at an earlier stage. The section,
Intelligent Tutoring Systems in Law and Ethical Reasoning, highlights
computational models of legal reasoning that have been incorporated
in systems designed to train law students in particular legal concepts,73 and in dialectical skills such as distinguishing caseS,74 and constructing,7s reviewing,76 and understanding legal arguments.77 These
online instructional techniques may provide law students, even those
participating in on-line legal education or MOOCs (Massive Open
Online Courses), the kind of argument-making practice that students in
traditional legal education receive in the classroom.
As Al programs are fielded, they raise legal issues, and Al and Law
programs are no exception. The section Legal and Ethical Issues Related
to Al and Law Programs,focuses on some of those legal issues having
to do with the legal status of intelligent agents,78 liability of intelligent
agents,79 unauthorized practice of law using legal expert systems,8o
and intellectual property in virtual environments or in contexts involving intelligent agents.81 Law students feel comfortable taking on such
topics using traditional legal research tools, but an effective legal analysis turns on a deeper understanding of~how the technology works. By
the end of the course students may thus be better equipped to take on
these issues of legal responsibility.
For instance, a legal e-treatise and a legal expert system both contain legal knowledge, some of which may be mistaken or applied with
73. Antoinette J. Muntjewerff, ICTin Legal Education, 10 GER. L. J.669 (2009).
74. See Aleven, supra note 29.
75. Chad S. Carr, Using Computer Supported Argument Visualization to Teach Legal Argumentation, in VISUALIZING ARGUMENTATION: SOFTWARE TOOLS FOR COLLABORATIVE AND EDUCATIONAL SENSEMAKING 75 (Paul A. Kirschner, Simon J. Buckingham Shum & Chad S. Carr eds., 2003).
76. Kevin Ashley & llya Goldin, Toward Al-enhanced Computer-supported Peer Review in
Legal Education, 2011 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ANN. CONF. ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYs. 1.
77. Collin Lynch, Kevin D. Ashley & Mohammad H. Falakmasir, Comparing Argument Diagrams, 2012 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANN. CONF. ONLEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYS. 81.
78. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 119

(2011).
79. Emad A. R. Dahiyat, Intelligent Agents and Liability: Is It a Doctrinal Problem or Merely A
Problem of Explanation?, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L.103 (2010).
80. Taiwo A. Oriola, The Use of Legal Software by Non-Lawyers and the Perils of Unauthorised
Practice of Law Charges in the United States: A Review of jayson Reynoso Decision, 18 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 285 (2010).
81. Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the
Rights of Owners, Programmers and VirtualAvatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649 (2006).
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injurious results. These two technologies differ, however, in the ways
and extent to which they invite reliance, presumably with different
implications for liability of the authors or knowledge engineers. Thus,
law students can write about something they know how to do (that is,
analyze legal liability), but still benefit from understanding how a legal
expert system selects and applies its legal knowledge and how it explains its conclusions. Additionally, the process can help law students
understand the limitations of the knowledge engineering techniques
by focusing on the gaps in its knowledge. One could also imagine inviting a law student to consider using the task of analyzing legal liability
of intelligent agents as the task to be modeled using AI and Law techniques.
The Syllabus thus conveys a coherent narrative about past and
current work in Al and Law, its challenges and its progress. The next
two sections highlight the salient lessons for law students concerning
both legal reasoning and understanding the new technologies for legal
practice. For convenient reference, the lessons are listed in Figure 1
and used to organize the presentation in the next two sections.
A. Lessons about legal rules
Lesson Al: Legal rules are subject to semantic ambiguity.
Lesson A2: Legal rules are subject to logical ambiguity.
Lesson A3: Statutory structure offects the meaning of legal rules.
Lesson A4: Legal rules are subject to unstated conditions.
B.Lessons about reasoning with legal cases
Lesson Bl: Distinguishing hard from easy cases of law is a key process.
Lesson B2: Analogizing and distinguishing cases are specifiable processes.
Lesson B3: Reasoning with cases and values is a kind of theory construction.
B4:
Legal advocates pose hypothetical cases to test legal rules.
Lesson
C.Lessons about legal argument
Lesson Cl: Advocates employ legal-domain-specific argument
schemes.
Lesson C2: One may attack a legal argument by attacking its assumptions or identifying exceptions.
Lesson C3: Legal arguments involve complex relationships among logic, rhetoric, uncertainty, and narrative.
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D. Lessons about legal Digital Documents Technologies
Lesson D1: Legal Digital Documents Technologies are based on process
models and algorithms.
Lesson D2: Processes underlying legal Digital Documents Technologies
involve different kinds of texts as inputs.
Lesson D3: Digital Documents Technologies find texts relevant to legal
problems.
Lesson D4: Digital Documents Technologies and their process models
need empirical methodologies for testing.
Lesson 05: Finding texts relevant to legal problems is different from
applying relevant texts to solve legal problems.
Lesson D6: Computational models of legal reasoning can be a bridge
between legal texts and legal problem solving.
Figure 1: Lessons law students can learn from the materials in the Al and Law
Seminar Syllabus
IV. Al AND LAW LESSONS ABOUT LEGAL RULES, CASES, AND ARGUMENTS

In uniquely concrete ways, Al and Law addresses lessons that law
students need to learn about legal rules, about reasoning with cases,
and about legal arguments generally. Opportunities to drive home
these lessons arise at various points in the Syllabus. These are opportunities for students to experience "Aha!" moments-small apotheoses
that can help ideas fall into place in law students' minds. This section
identifies those moments in the Syllabus and provides some context.
A. Lessons About Legal Rules
Lesson Al: Legal rules are subject to semantic ambiguity. By sometime in their first semester, law students have probably learned that
the meanings of concepts in a legal rule often are not well specified. By
the time they take an Al and Law seminar this is no longer news, but it
may yet be edifying for students to observe the practical ramifications
for building computer programs that reason with legal rules.
A statute can be modeled as a logic program82 or using heuristic
rules, but when the rules run out, resort must be made to something
else: expert queries, arguments from cases, or arguments from the
structure and purpose of the statute.
82. See Sergot et al., supra note 20.

804

CHICAGO-KENTLAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:3

Waterman faced this problem early on when using rules to define
product liability, strict liability, and comparative negligence in his program to guide settlement decision-making. Characteristically, his rule
in Figure 2 defining "strict liability" employs terms and concepts that
are defined in other rules, such as, "responsible for use of product" and
"incidental sale," each of which are defined in still other ruleS.83 However, some of the legal predicates important in this product liability
context, such as "reasonable and proper" or "foreseeable," are not otherwise defined in a legal rule. Some of the legal concepts-including
"emergency," "improper description," "property," "injury," "defective,"
and "careless,"-whether defined in rules or not, are ill-defined. Applying them to specific fact situations is an oft-litigated matter of interpretation and legally plausible arguments may often be made that the
concept does or does not apply.
[RULE4: STRICT LIABILITY DEFINITION]
IF(the plaintiff is injured by the product
or (the plaintiff does represent the decedent
and the decedent is killed by the product)
or the plaintiff's property is damaged by the product)
and the incidental-sale defense is not applicable
and (the product is manufactured by the defendant
or the product is sold by the defendant
or the product is leased by the defendant)
and the defendant is responsible for the use of the product
and (California is the jurisdiction of the case
or the user of the product is the victim
or the purchaser of the product is the victim)
and the product is defective at the time of the sale
and (the product is unchanged from the manufacture to the sale
or (the defendant's expectation is 'the product is unchanged
from the manufacture to the sale'
and the defendant's expectation is reasonable-and-proper))
THEN assert the theory of strict-liability does apply to the plaintiffs loss

Figure 2: Waterman's Rule Defining Strict Liability
Human legal analysis does not come to a standstill when encountering a term whose meaning is underspecified, and system designers
and knowledge engineers need to model how humans proceed. While
law students may understand the concept of "semantic ambiguity," it is
83. WATERMAN & PETERSON, supra note 4, at 16, 38.
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less clear how deeply they have thought about the methods human
lawyers use to deal with semantic ambiguity, the kinds of arguments
they use, what those arguments assume, and how those arguments can
be attacked.
Waterman listed four computational techniques with which a legal expert system could deal with ill-defined legal concepts:
1. Using heuristic rules (gleaned from legal experts or insurance adjusters) that attempt to capture how the term was
used in the past;
2. Presenting examples and letting the user decide if the term
is satisfied in the current fact situation;
3. Enabling the system to compare the current fact situation
with examples in order to determine if the term is satisfied;
and
4. Modifying the system's rules in a process of successive refinement in order to capture the concept's meaning.84
Much subsequent work in AI and Law has addressed these computational techniques. For instance, legal expert systems use the first and
second techniques to guide users in practical decision-malking. Researchers have focused on the third technique, in particular, by enabling a system to reason analogically with cases and make arguments
that the concept should apply or not apply to a new situation. This is
the subject of the work discussed in Section III of the Syllabus. Some
work has addressed the fourth technique, where the successive refinement comes in the form of annotating judicial explanations of decisions. The annotations highlight portions of the explanations that can
be matched to analyze new fact situations.85

Lesson A2: Legal rules are subject to logical ambiguity. While semantic ambiguity surprises few law students, far fewer are aware of
the problem of logical ambiguity in legal rules. Most seem surprised to
learn that even the logic of a legal rule may be ambiguous because the
scopes of logical connectors are not clearly delimited in natural language and because of the complexity of statutory structure. In formal
or mathematical logic, parentheses delimit scopes of logical or mathematical operators, but this is not the case in statutory and other natural language texts. Layman Allen provided many examples
demonstrating that even simple statutory rules have multiple logical
interpretations, of which the legislature was probably mostly unaware.
84. Id. at 26.
85. See, e.g., Branting,supra note 26; McLaren, supra note 36; Ashley & Walker, supra note
67.
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This is in sharp contrast to semantic ambiguities that may have been
included intentionally in order to facilitate a legislative compromise.
For instance, a Louisiana statute provided, "No person shall engage in
or institute a local telephone call... of an anonymous nature and
therein use obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent language, suggestions or proposals of an obscene nature and threats of
any kind whatsoever."86 To be in violation, however, must the telephone call include obscene language and threats, or is either sufficient?
In a criminal law context, of course, the answer can mean an acquittal.
Similarly, students learn that logical ambiguity may be crucial in the
interpretation of insurance policies and contracts. Given that one cannot assume that today's law students appreciate the need for close
reading and drafting of legal rules, this is an important lesson.
Allen lays out a stepwise procedure for normalizing a statutethat is, for systematically enumerating the alternative logical possibilities-so that one can select among the alternative logical interpretations. He emphasizes, however, that the choice is a matter for the
legislature, ideally in the drafting process. When developing a legal
expert system comprising statutory rules, knowledge engineers also
need to select among the alternatives. They try to select the alternative
that the legislature probably meant, but their selection is not authoritative. It is simply the knowledge engineer's interpretation of the statute.87 Alternatively, the rules in a legal expert system could be
heuristic rules embodying an expert's view on a field of statutory law.
The expert may have re-conceptualized or re-characterized statutory
terms in other ways that resolve syntactic (and semantic) ambiguities
in light of the expert's experience and that suffice for the purpose of
the system.
Allen's work also focuses students on the utility of normalization
and outline indentation in providing a flow-chart-like aid to understanding a complex statute. He illustrates this with a complex tax provision, IRC Sec. 354 governing exchanges of stock and securities in
certain reorganizations, which, like other provisions of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code, is "just plain awful from a syntactic viewpoint."88 He
then compares it with a normalized version that provides a flow chart

86. Allen & Engholm, supra note 22, at 384 (quoting State v. Hill, 157 So.2d 462, 462 (1963)).
87. Id. at 396 ("[W]hen a law has already been enacted, any form of the statute other than
the original enactment represents an interpretation. It is important that any representation which
purports to correspond to a statute say neither more nor less than the statute itself does.").
88. Id. at 388.
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through the provision's logic.89 It illustrates alternate paths through
the statutory rule's conditions to a conclusion and makes it much easier to see if there is a path to a conclusion. Students begin to appreciate
the potential for a more systematic way of drafting and presenting
complex legal provisions as an aid to their understanding of statutes
and as a goal for drafting contractual language.
Lesson A3: Statutorystructure affects the meaning of legal rules. Allen's tax code example also raises the problem of charting logical paths
when a statutory provision incorporates other provisions by reference
(which may involve yet other exceptions) or worse, when other provisions provide exceptions that are not explicitly cross-referenced. This
lesson also leads students to consider the significance in statutory interpretation of a provision's position in the statute or statutory code
relative to other provisions. The hierarchical structure of a statute or
code carries information that can help to resolve an otherwise illdefined term, as occurs regularly in civil law interpretation.
AI and Law researchers have not made much progress on modeling such phenomena.9o However, they encounter these problems frequently and usually with frustration. In work on automatically
extracting information from statutory texts using machine learningfor instance, where it is reasonable to assume that a provision's outline
structure of parts and subparts provides semantically valuable information-it may even be unclear to a competent human reader whether
an unlabeled paragraph at the end of a provision is a subpart of the
preceding subsection or an independent subpart.
Lesson A4: Legal rules are subject to unstated conditions.Just as a
legal rule may have unreferenced exceptions, it also may have unstated
conditions, for instance, that it is not unconstitutional, that it is not
preempted, or that it can be applied without contravening legal principles. Allen raises the question of how one knows which unstated conditions to include, when such a condition applies and how to resolve
whether the rule applies. These are tough questions for both law students and knowledge engineers. While it might be thought that socalled canons of construction resolve such questions, Allen points to

89. Id. at 393, fig. 4.
90. But see Bench-capon & Coenen, supra note 21; Tom Routen, Hierarchically Organised
Formalisations,1989 PROC. OF THE SECOND INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 242.
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Karl Llewellyn's convincing characterization of the canons as makeweights.91
In Obstacles to the Development of Logic-Based Models of Legal
Reasoning, Berman and Hafner argued persuasively that, even if there
is agreement on facts and the applicable law, adversaries can still generate reasonable pro and con arguments, and courts come to different
conclusions. This legal indeterminacy is caused by conflicts inherent in
the unstated conditions concerning whether a legal rule really should
apply, whether applying it counters underlying principles, what the
rule's open-textured concepts mean in a given context, and how to
resolve inconsistent canons of construction and inconsistent precedents. As a result of this legal indeterminacy, they argued, deductive
logic-oriented models of statutory law cannot succeed.92
Berman and Hafner cite Riggs v. Palmer93 among other examples
of legal indeterminacy. Riggs posed the quandary as to whether a
grandson who murdered his grandfather would inherit under his
grandfather's will. The explicit conditions of the rule that "any heir to
property of a deceased person may claim that property from the estate
of the decedent" are satisfied. But applying the rule would violate the
principle that "any legal rule will not apply to the benefit of a party
who performed a felonious act offering serious harm to others, which
brought about conditions under which the rule would apply to his benefit." Such a principle is a rule about rules and poses technical problems. The logical system would need to support quantification of a rule
over all rules.
More importantly, Berman and Hafner concluded, the phenomenon of legal indeterminacy leads to a more profound problem: logicbased computational models are inappropriate for modeling how lawyers reason. The technical problem is that, in classical logic, it is impossible to validly prove (or argue for) a proposition and its opposite.
Their examples illustrate, however, that even when advocates start
with the same premises (that is, axioms, rules, and accepted facts),
they still generate legally reasonable, but contradictory arguments.94
91. Layman Allen & Charles Saxon, Some Problems in Designing Expert Systems to Aid Legal
Reasoning, 1987 PROC. OF THE FIRST INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 94, 105. For example,
"A statute cannot go beyond its text" v. "To effect its purpose a statute may be implemented
beyond its text." "If language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect" v. "Not when
literal interpretation would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart manifest
purpose."
92. Berman & Hafner, supra note 23.
93. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
94. Berman & Hafner, supra note 23, at 191.
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Indeed, legal instructors regularly demand that law students produce
arguments and counterarguments in analyzing exam problems and
demand that students recommend resolutions.
Reading Berman and Hafner's account, it would be hard for law
students not to reflect on how they, as human reasoners, deal with
legal indeterminacy. Given these problems of semantic and syntactic
ambiguity, implicit exceptions, and unstated conditions, it is clear that
attorneys reason about legal rules as opposed to simply reasoning with
legal rules. Attorneys employ arguments in order to convince themselves and others what a concept means, whether an exception applies,
or whether an unstated condition is satisfied. The lesson for law students, and for Al and Law researchers, is that reasoning about legal
rules involves the need to consider arguments for and against applying
the rule.
As developed in the Syllabus, AI and Law researchers have sought
to model some of those types of arguments (including reasoning with
cases, values, and principles) using argument schema with conditions
and exceptions, leading to the remaining pedagogical lessons.95
B.

Lessons About Reasoning with Legal Cases

Lesson Bl: Distinguishing hardfrom easy cases of law is a key process. There are so many potential conflicts in applying legal rules that
students might well wonder how human reasoners distinguish hard
from easy cases of law.
If hard questions are those where, even though attorneys agree on
the facts, there are conflicting reasonable arguments about the outcome or the explanation, are there any easy questions where legal experts would agree on both the outcome and explanation of the result?
Surely some legal decisions raise no disputable point of law for a side;
legal practitioners routinely make dozens of legal decisions!
In a first-year legal writing or legal process course, law students
may have encountered this issue in the form of the jurisprudential
debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller,96 but it is an issue that law
students confront repeatedly, if not reflectively, at the end of every
semester. Law students must, of course, decide which issues to develop
at length on an exam and which to ignore, a decision that involves as95. Alternatively, Al and Law researchers have sought to find applications where these
limitations on logic will not have negative practical consequences.
96. See, e.9., Berman & Hafnersupranote 23, at 185-86.
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sessing the opportunities presented by the strengths and weaknesses
crafted into the instructor's scenario in light of the legal rules and decisions covered in the course. Indeed, assessing students' ability to make
such decisions effectively, flexibly and under pressure is one of the
reasons why instructors assign essay-type exam problems in law
school. Thus, helping law students to reflect on how these decisions
are made can be a timely and useful lesson.
In her contracts-test-taking program, Anne Gardner was the first
to offer an algorithmic heuristic method for distinguishing hard from
easy questions. The inputs to her (unnamed) program are representations of law student contracts examination problems dealing with offer
and acceptance. The outputs are analyses of the problem characterizing the events as offers or acceptances and identifying the legal issues
involved. Gardner took the position that there must be easy cases. At
least, we treat questions as easy all the time. If there were no easy cases, everything would be open to interpretation and answers would
forever elude us. Crucially from the viewpoint of system designers, she
pointed out that the method for determining whether a case is easy
must be easy, too. Her heuristic method for distinguishing hard from
easy cases is presented in Figure 3 as amplified in a characterization by
Rissland.97
For every predicate in the rule,
If common sense knowledge rules provide an answer, then CSK-Answer is True, else False.
If problem matches positive examples of predicate, then Pos-Examples is True, else False.
If problem matches negative examples of predicate, then Neg-Examples isTrue, else False.
If - CSK-Answer
If - (Pos-Examples or Neg-Examples) --> Question is HARD

If (only one of Pos-Examples / Neg-Examples) --> Question is EASY
If (Pos-Examples and Neg-Examples) --> Question is HARD
If CSK-Answer
If - (Pos-Examples or Neg-Examples) --> Question is EASY

If (only one of Pos-Examples / Neg-Examples)
If (agrees only-one w/ CSK-Answer) --> Question easy, else Question is HARD
If (Pos-Examples and Neg-Examples) --> Question is HARD

Figure 3: Gardner's Heuristic Method for Distinguishing Hard from Easy Cases

It is instructive for law students to ponder Gardner's method as
they think about how attorneys decide which predicates to argue
97. Rissland, supra note 17, at 1970, n.62; Gardner, supra note 19, at 54-55, 160-61.
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about, and, indeed, how they (the students) decide which exam issues
to develop. The strategy in Gardner's program can be expressed algorithmically as a set of steps and provides a model that students can
adapt into a more realistic strategy. For one thing, students will probably require the algorithm to involve case comparisons.
In Gardner's program, the examples were not full-blown cases, but
at best snippets of cases capturing paradigm, standard, or extreme
values for variables like "immediately." However, simple direct matches of positive and negative examples are not sufficient. A way is needed
to compare the problem to case examples more robustly. The algorithm would be a more useful model of students' exam-taking strategies, if it took into account comparing a problem scenario's facts with
those of cases where courts decided that the legal predicate did or did
not apply. The decision of whether the problem is a hard or easy case
depends on the strength of the analogies to other cases. If the positive
case example is very close on the facts but the negative one is not, it
may not be a hard question.
Lesson B2: Analogizing and distinguishingcases are specifiable processes. Considering an algorithm for distinguishing hard from easy
questions of law leads naturally to considering the design of algorithms for comparing cases. In short, it leads students to contemplate
the point of drawing legal analogies, how one defines "relevant similarity" and "relevant difference", and how one assesses the strength of the
analogies. Gardner's examples clearly did not contain enough factual
information to compare how analogous cases are, to assess how their
similarities might justify treating a problem scenario in the same way
as a case, or to assess how their differences might justify not doing so.
Law students all know that they need to analogize and distinguish
cases. Much Socratic classroom discussion involves students distinguishing among the cases in the course text on a particular issue. In
course essay exams, students are called upon to analogize or distinguish those cases and the problem scenario. It is less clear that law
students understand what analogies and distinctions are and why they
matter in legal analysis.
As summarized in Table 1, the Syllabus provides numerous examples of the ways in which Al and Law researchers have attempted to
model legally relevant similarities and differences. They focus on identifying legally meaningful patterns of fact, ranging from:
* generalized fact descriptions whose presence or absence is
deemed by an expert to bear on an issue, to
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stereotypical patterns of facts that, according to experts, and
as confirmed in cases, typically strengthen a side's claim or
argument on an issue, to varying degrees, to
* excerpts of the critical facts from a judge's explanation justifying his or her decision of a particular issue.
Researchers index these patterns by claims, elements of claims or
other issues, and underlying values or principles. The indexes are then
associated with reasons. As a result, computer programs can identify
legally relevant similarities and differences, use them to analogize and
distinguish cases, and explain the significance of the analogies and
distinctions to the decision of a problem. These tasks focus on the
manner in which underlying values play a role in relevance.
*

2013]

DIGITAL AGE LEGAL PRACTICE

813

Table 1: Computational Measures of Relevance

Relevance
Representation

Definition

Domain / Example

Relevance Measure

Source

Descriptor

Binary fact descriptions
relevant to legal outcome
(46 descriptors for tax
law, capital gains)
Stereotypical pattern of
facts that strengthen /
weaken: a side's claim
(13 trade secret dimensions)
Stereotypical pattern of
facts that strengthen /
weaken: side's argument
re issue (14 dimensions
for tax law, home office
deduction)
Binary version of dimension (26 trade secret
factors)
Reason why factor matters (13 trade secret
abstract factors)
Binary version of dimension associated with issue

Qualified for capital gains tax /
at time of purchase, private
party had other intention than
to resell at a profit
Trade secret misappropriation
/ Disclosures-to-outsiders

k-nearest neighbor

Mackaay &
Robillard, supra
note 31.

Overlap of sets of
dimensions in
scenario and cases

Ashley, supra
note 5.

Home office deduction/principal-place of business:relative-home-work-time

Overlap of sets of
dimensions per
issue in scenario
and cases

Rissland &
Skalak, supra
note 33.

Trade secret misappropriation
/ Disclosures-to-outsiders (T
or F)
Trade secret misappropriation
/ Efforts to maintain secrecy

Overlap of sets of
factors in scenario
and cases
Shared reason

Aleven, supra
note 29.

Trade secret misappropriation
/ Info-trade-secret / maintainsecrecy

Overlap of sets of
factors per issue in
scenario and cases
Ratio of case
criterial facts
matched in scenario

Ashley & Braninghaus, Computer Models,
supra note 30.
Branting, supra
note 26.

Dimension

Dimension per
issue (i.e., claim
element or rule
term)

Factor

Abstract factor

Factor per issue

Criterial explanation per issue

Significant excerpt from
explanation of why judge
decided issue (represented as semantic network)

Factors plus
values

Legal value served by
factor (4 factors and 3
values for property law in
wild animals)

The employee (Vaughn) had
intense hunger, which impedes his duties as truck
driver and which was decreased by having food at a
restaurant.
Property in wild game / plaintiff-pursuing-his-livelihood
safeguards socially desirable
economic activity.

Criterial explanations per principle

Critical excerpt from
explanation of why judge
decided principle applied
(or not)

Owner's attorney instructs
Engineer A to withhold information regarding apartment
building.

Best theory of
preferences among
competing factors
and competing
values
Best structural
mapping using
heuristic cost
function

Aleven, supra
note 29.

Bench-Capon &
Sartor, supra
note 35.

McLaren, supra
note 36.
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It is instructive for law students to compare the representational
techniques in Table 1 in terms of the extent to which they capture or
omit legally relevant considerations. For instance, descriptors, dimensions and factors serve as a kind of checklist of important fact patterns.
These lists support reasoning about a problem in terms of fact patterns
that are not present, and they are associated explicitly with reasons or
values that serve to explain why they matter. On the other hand, these
lists are fixed; they need to be updated as new patterns emerge. Criterial explanations are dynamic in the sense that, as a human enters the
cases and their explanations into the database, the individual can annotate the explanatory snippets that the judge regarded as critical. The
explanatory snippets can then be associated with or indexed by the
reasons or values to which they relate. In processing a new case, the
explanatory snippets can be matched to the new case's facts, taking
into account that these facts may be expressed in different terms.
One way or the other, legally important fact patterns can be associated with underlying reasons, values, and principles. This association
is important, because, as Berman and Hafner drove home,98 the sometimes competing values to which the facts give rise are a crucial focus
of legal arguments on how to decide a problem scenario and a major
focus of jurisprudential efforts to justify legal analogy as an interpretive phenomenon. How to represent the weights or significance of the
patterns and values in the analysis of a scenario, and how to resolve
competing values, has proven controversial. While representing
weights numerically facilitates computational processing, researchers
generally observe that explanations and arguments directed to legal
practitioners and judges do not treat weights numerically. It is also
agreed that the weights of values cannot be modeled using fixed hierarchies; some more context-sensitive means of setting the weights is
needed. Finally, it is agreed that the weights vary over time as society's
values change. For instance, over the relatively short period in which
the Internet has become pervasive, the value of privacy across societies and generations within a society has increasingly been in flux.
Lesson B3: Reasoning with cases and values is a kind of theory construction. In their model of reasoning with cases and values, BenchCapon and Sartor characterize the model "as a process of constructing
and using a theory."99 In this kind of theory construction, the outcomes
98. Berman & Hafner, supra note 34.
99. Bench-Capon & Sartor, supra note 35, at 98. This important insight stems from McCarty,
supra note 24, at 285: "The task for a lawyer or a judge in a 'hard case' is to construct a theory of
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of past cases reveal preferences between sets of factors present in
those cases, and those, in turn, reveal preferences between sets of values. The theory has explanatory power. The induced preferences between sets of values explain preferences between sets of factors, and
these explain the outcome in past cases. The theory can also be applied
to determine and explain the outcome of new cases.
It is an elegant theoretical model, but not without problems. First,
more than one theory can be induced; one has to assess the competing
theories in terms of their coherence operationalized in terms of their
explanatory power (that is, the number of cases the theory explains),
consistency, and simplicity. However, the latter two criteria are not
very well understood. Second, from a jurisprudential viewpoint, it does
not appear that judges do or should use preferences among competing
values in past cases to decide new problems. Assessing proposed outcomes of a problem in terms of values is an ethical decision of its own.
A judge needs to consider how the values apply, given the problem's
particular facts. Even if a judge were to use value preferences in past
cases as a guide, one would expect that the judge would still need to
compare the problem to the cases in detail to be sure that applying that
preference in the new circumstance is appropriate. For this kind of
comparison, a finer grained representation of the facts would surely be
necessary.
In any event, from an instructional viewpoint, the Bench-Capon
and Sartor piece focuses law students on the question of what a legal
theory of a case looks like, how it relates to precedents and values, and
the role of underlying values in defining relevant similarities for purposes of analogizing and distinguishing cases. More generally, the
question is, how do legal practitioners take values and principles into
account in reasoning about how to decide problems?
Lesson B4: Legal advocates pose hypothetical cases to test legal
rules. One way legal practitioners take values and principles into account is by posing hypotheticals. A hypothetical is a made-up scenario
designed to test certain properties of a proposed rule for deciding a
case. Law students who have read, listened to, or watched any oral
arguments before the United States Supreme Court will have encountered hypotheticals. To the consternation of legal advocates, the justices are famous for posing hypotheticals. And, of course, students have
likely encountered hypotheticals posed by an instructor in Socratic
the disputed legal rules that produces the desired legal result, and then to persuade the relevant
audience that this theory is preferable to any theories offered by an opponent."
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classroom discussions. Students, however, may not have adequately
considered the rhetorical point of posing hypotheticals in a legal argument: What constitutes an effective hypothetical, what force does a
hypothetical have, and how can one respond to such an argument?
Al and Law researchers have made progress in computationally
modeling hypothetical reasoning.loo For law students, this work can
help to clarify the nature of the adversarial process in which an advocate tries to convince a court how to decide a case. The advocate is
really trying to convince the court that the advocate's proposed rule or
test for deciding the case at bar is a good rule to adopt both in the instant case and for future cases. On one view, the advocate is arguing
that the effect on applicable values of deciding the case in accord with
the proposed rule is preferable to the effect of not doing so or of applying some other rule.
Thus, the adversarial process unfolds as follows: The advocate
proposes a rule or test to decide the case at bar in favor of his or her
client. The judge challenges the proposed test by posing a hypothetical
situation where the result under the test is debatable. The advocate
responds to the hypothetical by arguing that the result under the proposed test is justifiable, either by modifying the proposed test so that
the result is justifiable or by distinguishing or analogizing the hypothetical.1o
If the judge is concerned that the proposed rule may be too broad,
he or she may construct a hypothetical to which the rule applies, but
where the effects of applying the rule to the hypothetical are detrimental to a value underlying the rule. The advocate may respond by
arguing that:
* the rule does not apply to the hypothetical, which is distinguishable, or
* the rule applies but the effect on the value is not as severe as
the judge suggests, or
* the rule applies and is detrimental to the value, but that another value related to the rule is promoted, or
* the rule applies and is detrimental to the value and that the
rule should be changed so that it no longer applies to the
hypothetical.
100. See, e.g., Ashley, supra note 5; Kevin D. Ashley, Teaching a Process Model of Legal Argument with Hypotheticals, 17 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 321 (2009); Grabmair & Ashley, supra
0
note 39.
101. Ashley, Teaching a Process Model, supra note 100, at 326-27; Grabmair & Ashley, supra
note 39, at 164.
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A complementary scheme of arguments applies where the judge is
concerned that the proposed rule may be too narrow.
By considering the models of hypothetical reasoning and its application in Supreme Court arguments, law students can come to understand this important legal and rhetorical strategy.
C

Lessons About Legal Argument

Lesson Cl: Advocates employ legal domain-specific argument
schemes. As the previous lessons suggest, one way to characterize the
progress of Al and Law research is as a continuing search to identify
and model legal domain-specific argument schemes, including schemes
for arguing from rules, from cases, and with values. An argument
scheme corresponds to a typical framework in the domain for making
an inference sanctioned by the argument; it corresponds to a kind of
primafacie reason for believing the argument's conclusion.102 Some of
these argument schemes connect with the computational models of
legal reasoning that have been developed thus far. Others are new;
researchers are developing argument schemes for arguing from evidentiary facts to rule-driven legal conclusions.1o3
From their Legal Writing course, law students are already familiar
with suggested formats or schemes for proving a conclusion of law in a
written brief. For instance:
1. State your conclusion.
2. State the primary rule that supports the conclusion.
3. Prove and explain the rule through citation to authority, description of how the authority stands for the rule, discussion of subsidiary
rules, analyses of policy, and counter-analyses.
4. Apply the rule's elements to the facts with the aid of subsidiary
rules, supporting authority, policy considerations, and counteranalyses.
5. If steps 1 through 4 are complicated, sum up by restating your
conclusion.104
At least some of those steps, however, can be unpacked into additional schemes. For instance, one can imagine unpacking Step 4 into,
and Al and Law researchers have implemented, additional argument
schema to support or counter the assertion that a proposed rule
102. HENRY PRAKKEN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, LOGIC AND ARGUMENT SCHEMES, IN ARGUING
ON THE TOULMIN MODEL 236 (David Hitchcock & Bart Verheij eds., 2006).

103. See, e.g., Walker et al., supra note 40.
104. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE
93-94 (6th ed. 2009).
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should apply by analogizing a case in support of applying a rule's elements to the facts or by countering such an analogy.os

rule s.1601-BGB
Person1 is obligated to support Person2
if Personl is in direct lineage to Person2
rule s.1589-BGB
Person1 is in direct lineage to Person2
if Personl is an ancestor of Person2
rule s.91-BSHG
s. 1601-BGB excludes "Person1 is obligated to support Person2"
if "Personl is obligated to support Person2" would
cause Person1 undue hardship
rule s.1602-BGB
Person1 is not obligated to support Person2 under
s. 1601-BGB
unless Person2 is needy.

rule s.1601-BGB-is a legal rule with
* Premises:
If direct-lineage(Personl, Person2)

* Conclusion
...then obligated-to-support(Personl, Person2)
presumably true.

* Critical Questions
Unless exception to 1601 applies (e.g., rule
o
s.1602-BGB)
Assuming assumptions of 1601 are met
o
Assuming 1601 is a valid legal rule
o
Unless some rule excluding 1601 (e.g., rule s
o
BSHG) applies
Unless some conflicting rule of higher prioril
o
than 1601 applies

Figure 4: "Family law" rule set and representation of rule as defeasible
Lesson C2: One may attack a legal argument by attacking its assumptions or identifying exceptions. An argument scheme for interpreting how legal rules should apply to problems, for instance, can focus
law students on questioning the rule's assumptions or considering
exceptions. Currently in Al and Law research, reasoning with a legal
rule would be treated as defeasible and subject to an argument scheme
for reasoning with defeasible rules.
Defeasible reasoning through argument can be illustrated in an
argument-scheme-driven example of statutory reasoning using Tom
Gordon's argument diagramming program, Carneades.106 For instance,
the left half of Figure 4 shows four legal rules involving family law

105. See, e.g., Grabmair & Ashley, supra note 39, at 164-66.
106. Gordon & Walton, supra note 38; Thomas F. Gordon, Analyzing Open Source License
Compatibility Issues with Carneades, 2011 PROC. OF THE THIRTEENTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 50, 51; Thomas F.Gordon, Constructing Legal Arguments with Rules in the Legal
Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF), in COMPUTABLE MODELS OF THE LAW 162, 168-69 (Pompeu

Casanovas, Giovanni Sartor, Niria Casellas & Rossella Rubino eds., 2008).
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based on the German Civil Code. Rule s.1601-BGB declares that person1 is obligated to support person2 if the former is in "direct lineage"
with the latter, a concept defined in Rule s.1589-BGB.
Employing a scheme for arguing with defeasible rules is necessary
because a classical logical system could not successfully handle the
rules on the left of Figure 4. If the goal is to determine if Harry is obligated to support Sally and one learns that Harry is an ancestor of Sally,
a classical logical system has no difficulty in chaining backward from
Rule s.1601-BGB to Rule s.1589-BGB, inferring from Harry's being Sally's ancestor that Harry is in "direct lineage" to Sally and thus has the
obligation to support her. Suppose one then learns, however, that being obligated to support Sally would cause Harry undue hardship. As a
matter of deductive reasoning, rule s.91-BSHG implies that Harry's
obligation to support Sally is excluded. The system would then have
proven two inconsistent consequences; Harry is both obligated and not
obligated to support Sally. Berman and Hafner identified this problem.107 Classical logical deduction is monotonic; once one proves a
proposition, one cannot take it back just because one learns of new
information. This ability to prove a proposition and its opposite means
the system is inconsistent and can prove anything. CRASH!
And yet, as explained by Berman and Hafnerloa that kind of thing
happens all the time in law! If researchers want a computer to draw
inferences from legal rules in a realistic manner, classical logical deduction cannot be used. One has to use something else.
In the field of Al and Law, the current answer to "what else is
there?" is a computational model of argument with appropriate argument schemes to enable defeasible reasoning. What is different about
the representation of a legal rule as defeasible is shown in the right
half of Figure 4. Rule s.1601-BGB is defeasible because the statute contains two exceptions to the obligation to support. First, under Rule
s.91-BSHG person1 is not obligated to support when it would cause
person1 "undue hardship." Second, Rule s.1602-BGB provides for another exception if person2 is not "needy."
Thus, Rule s.1601-BGB contains premises and a conclusion, but
the conclusion is only presumably (i.e., defeasibly) true, signaling that
there are some facts the system might learn that could defeat the conclusion, even though the premises were true. These defeasibility condi-

107. Berman & Hafner, supra note 23.
108. Id.
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tions are represented as "Critical Questions," which identify assumptions and exceptions that affect the rule's applicability: Are the specified underlying assumptions met? Does a specified exception apply? Is
the rule valid? Does some exclusionary rule apply? Does some conflicting rule of higher priority apply?
There is little agreement across the field about how to express
such questions or what to call the different types of defeasibility conditions, but researchers generally agree that these defeasibility conditions need to be specified because, as directed by an argument scheme,
the program will test them.
Harry Isobligated
to support Sally

+

O0

s.1601 BGB

Harry and Sally are in
direct lineage

+

0

s.1601is excluded

O

s.1589 BGB

s 189 Is excluded
Figure 5: Carneades argument diagram with defeasible inference rules
A system like Tom Gordon's Carneades can reason with the defeasible inference rules and construct arguments. Figure 5 shows a manually prepared version of an argument diagram that Carneades can
generate.109 Statement nodes are boxes and argument nodes are circles (with a "+"indicating support and a dashed line indicating an ex-

ception to the argument's applicability). If one specifies a goal of
109. Gordon & Walton, supra note 38; Gordon, Analyzing Open Source License Compatibility
Issues, supra note 106, at 54-55; Gordon, Constructing LegalArguments, supra note 106, at 179.
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showing that Harry is obligated to support Sally, the Carneades rules
engine reasons backwards from that goal to find defeasible inference
rules to support that goal: rules s.1601 and s.1589. As the arguments
are constructed and edited, they are visualized in an argument map or
diagram. A shaded statement node indicates that the statement is assumed to be true (by the relevant audience.) A shaded upper small
circle next to a node indicates that the argument is acceptable (according to the relevant proof standard). (If the lower circle were shaded,
the statement's complement is acceptable.)
Harry Is obligatedO
to support Salty

O

s.1601 BGB

s.91 BSHG

Figure 6: Rule's defeasible conclusion prevented by argument based on another rule.

If one specifies a goal of defeating that argument, the program
searches through the critical questions associated with the rules to find
applicable exceptions, exclusions, or failures of assumptions that
would prevent the argument's presumed conclusion. Thus, having
learned that being obligated to support Sally would cause Harry undue
hardship, the program would find such an exclusion. The rule s.91
BSHG applies and prevents the argument's conclusion, as indicated in
Figure 6.
Suppose that being obligated to support Sally would cause Harry
undue hardship is not a given fact. Instead, let us assume that, although
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"undue hardship" is not defined by a legal rule, courts have found for
or against undue hardship in cases involving certain factors:
PlaintiffP) Factors (pro finding of undue
hardship):

Defendant(D) Factors (con
undue hardship):

PF1. has-already-provided-much-support

DF1.
short

PF2. never-had-parent-child-relationship

DF2. has-not-provided-care

PF3.

finding of

expected-duration-of-support-is-

would-cause-irreparable-harm-to-

family

In particular, suppose there are three cases:
Mueller: P wins undue hardshipissue where {PF2}
Schmidt: D wins undue hardship issue where {PF2, DF1}
Bauer: P wins undue hardship issue where {PF2, DF1, PF3}
Finally, let us assume that: Harry and Sally never had a parentchild relationship, PF2, and that Sally needs support for only a short
time period, DF1.

more on point
counterexamle

0
0

Figure 7: Rule's defeasible conclusion prevented by argument based on Mueller case,
which, in turn is trumped by argument based on Schmidt Case.
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In this situation, Carneades could construct arguments for and
against Harry having an obligation to support Sally based on casebased inferences, as shown in Figure 7.11o The Mueller case, which
shares PF2 with the problem, supports an argument that s.91 BSHG
causes the obligation to be excluded under s.1601 BGB. The Schmidt
case, however, is more on point (because the set of factors shared between Mueller and the problem is a subset of those shared between
Schmidt and the problem, namely PF2 and DF1) and had the opposite
result. In the terminology of HYPO111 the Schmidt case trumps Mueller.
Lesson C3: Legal arguments involve complex relationships among
logic, rhetoric, uncertainty, and narrative.Although the family law example is simple, law students might still be impressed with Carneades'
ability to generate and integrate legal arguments of multiple types into
a visual format that is readily interpretable. Law students can see an
argument structure that is more complex than simply applying legaf
rules deductively.
The demonstration also begs the question how attorneys factor
uncertainty and rhetorical considerations into their assessments of
legal arguments. Legal argument is a technique for dealing with uncertainty (such as in legal planning), but uncertainty also affects legal argument. This uncertainty includes uncertainty about: evidence and the
plausibility of factual assertions, the normative application of the law
to facts, moral assessment of the alternative results, and the likelihood
of acceptance of arguments.
The question then arises if and how to factor uncertainty into argument diagrams. A number of articles in the Syllabus address dealing
with uncertainties in a Carneades-like argument model. One way is to
implement burdens of persuasion or burdens of proof in the argument
diagrams such as "preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt." These burdens of proof assist, for example, by associating a quantitative measure of evidential certainty with the arcs
connecting arguments to conclusions and imposing an appropriate
quantitative standard.112
In addition, the Carneades argument models could be augmented
with an ability to reason with uncertainties (using Bayesian belief networks); this change would allow an advocate to explore the conse-

110. See sources cited supra notes 38 and 109.
111. Ashley, supra note 5, at 784.
112. Gordon & Walton, supra note 38, at 137-38; Atkinson and Bench-Capon, supra note 37.
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quences of various assumptions about evidentiary uncertainties.113
For instance, should she argue the facts or the law? In order to assess
how best to improve her chances of a favorable decision, an advocate
could modify the assumed probability distributions representing the
jurys' beliefs in various evidential facts or modify the weights representing the jury's belief in the plausibility of various arguments. The
same work explores the role of narrative in assessing evidential uncertainties in the stories that attorneys attempt to fit to the evidence. Different narratives lend themselves to different legal claims. Evidence
that seems plausible given one story may be irrelevant to or contradicted by another story. While the computational techniques for modeling these aspects of legal argument are in their infancy, law students
can benefit from thinking about the underlying phenomena.
This completes the discussion of how an Al and Law seminar can
be used to teach law students some classic lessons about law. The material can also teach lessons that help prepare law students for legal
practice in the digital age.
V.

CONNECTING COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF LEGAL REASONING WITH THE

DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES IN LEGAL PRACTICE

Law students need to understand the "information revolution" affecting the field of law and how it impacts their prospects for legal employment, the kinds of legal employment available, and their
responsibilities as legal practitioners in a digital age. A distinguished
academic observer of legal practice trends and their effects on the law
school curriculum has recently observed:
The complexity of a ... [law school] curriculum is further compounded by an information revolution that is changing the mix of
current and future jobs. Because of the emphasis on process and
technology now taking hold within the legal industry, the practical
technical skills and domain knowledge [now taught] may be inadequate for a large proportion of law students graduating in the year
2015.114... [Students] ... are unprepared to learn that law is be-

coming less about jury trials and courtroom advocacy and more
about process engineering, predictive coding, and the collaborative
and technical skills those processes entail.115
The technology to which Henderson refers mainly involves automating the document review process so that it can deal with the ex113. Grabmair & Ashley, supra note 68.
114. William D. Henderson, A Blueprintfor Change,40 PEPP. L.REv. 461, 501 (2013).
115. Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
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traordinarily large numbers of electronic documents involved in modern litigation using machine learning techniques, also known as predictive coding. Programs are learning to select electronic documents from
enormous caches produced in modern lawsuits and to cluster them in
terms of their relevance, based on litigators' labeling of small sets of
documents as relevant or not to the claims and defenses.
"[P]redictive coding [...] [i]n essence,... is machine algorithms partially replacing humans altogether in the search for relevant information."116 This development is driven by the size and diversity of
the e-discovery caches.
Because of the massive explosion of digital data, where so much of
our daily lives are encoded into emails, text messages, internal
knowledge management platforms designed to replace email, and
digitized voice mail, the scope of discovery in civil or white collar litigation has become prohibitively expensive using traditional methods of review.117
The emphasis on "processes" is especially important for law students facing the legal employment market. Paraphrasing Richard Susskind's The End of Lawyers?118 Henderson states,
These changes [from legal work that is bespoke (or customized) to
standardized, systematized, packaged, and, ultimately, commoditized] are made possible by identifying recursive patterns in legal
forms and judicial opinions, which enables the use of process and
technology to routinize and scale very cheap and very high quality
solutions to the myriad of legal needs.119
[F]ormerly labor-intensive work that has traditionally been performed by entry-level United States law school graduates ... is now

being done by Indian law graduates [working for Legal Process Outsourcers (LPOs),] who are learning how to design and operate processes that extract useful information from large masses of digital
text. Not only are the Indian law graduates getting the employment,
they are learning valuable skills that are entirely-entirely-absent
from U.S. law schools.120
Attorneys, law firms, judges, and regulatory agencies increasingly
will need to assess, purchase, rely upon, and justify products and services that employ machine learning, data mining, natural language
processing, and information retrieval for use in e-discovery and other
legal information management processes. For ease of reference, these
techniques will be referred to collectively as "Digital Documents Tech116. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OFLAWYERS? 6 (2010).

119. Henderson, supra note 114, at 479 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 487(emphasis added).
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nologies". Although driven by the pressures of e-discovery, Digital
Documents Technologies are not just for litigation. They will be important in all areas of corporate business and legal practice that involve the need to develop processes for managing corporate
documents, for example, tax, mergers and acquisitions, and regulatory
compliance.
As developed below, the Al and Law seminar can help law students understand Digital Documents Technologies by exposing them to
information processes, algorithms, and process engineering. Indeed,
the seminar may frequently be their first systematic exposure to these
concepts.
It should be made clear from the outset, however, that the computational models of legal reasoning discussed in Parts 1, 2, and 3 of the
Syllabus are different from those at the heart of current Digital Documents Technologies. Digital Documents Technologies have their roots
in full-text legal information retrieval, advances in computational linguistics (such as shallow text parsing and named entity recognition)
and statistical natural language processing, machine learning and data
mining. The ramifications of these different roots and a description of
how the approaches might ultimately intertwine are described below.
The relevant point here is, simply, that most of the Al and Law
work in the Syllabus, used to teach law students lessons about legal
rules, cases, and arguments, does not address the same tasks and processes as the Digital Documents Technologies. Indeed, a stark contrast
exists between the ways in which Digital Documents Technologies and
students process legal knowledge, a contrast that pits the efficiency of
the machine learning, data mining, natural language processing and
information retrieval models against the expressiveness of the AI and
Law models. Legal information retrieval, for instance, deals with vast
numbers of documents and natural language queries, with which
Westlaw and Lexis are remarkably effective. However, those programs
do not process the texts in any depth; Westlaw and Lexis cannot even
tell who won a case or issue, much less how to use the text in an argument about a legal issue. Moreover, these programs cannot filter documents that have/do not have specified features, as opposed to
phrases.
Despite these technological differences, the Al and Law seminar
can help law students understand Digital Documents Technologies by
teaching them the following tools:
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1. a conceptual vocabulary for describing the Technologies in
terms of computational models, algorithms, relevance
measures, and experimental evaluations;
2. high-level descriptions of the task specifications, computational models, and algorithms underlying the Technologies;
3. the ways in, and extent to, which the performance of these
Technologies can be measured experimentally, and what the
measures signify;
4. examples of what the computational models underlying the
Technologies capture and what the models leave out; and
5. the legal processes into which the Technologies are embedded, including hardware, software, human technical intermediaries, and human legal practitioners.
In sum, participating in the Al and Law seminar gives law students
an experience of thinking "computationally" about the processes of
legal practice and about the processing of legal information. Although
today's law students grew up with the Internet and are intimately familiar with interfaces into the World Wide Web, they probably have
not engaged much in thinking systematically about information processes in legal practice. These students most likely have little background in programming, and have thought neither about developing
algorithms to implement specifications nor about using successive
refinement to develop sub-algorithms for each step. However, by the
end of the seminar, these students will have done both, first with the
legal reasoning algorithms and then with algorithms for e-discovery.
This is a sensible progression for law students unfamiliar with
how full-text legal information retrieval works. Techniques such as
Bayesian belief networks for full-text retrieval, machine learning from
large data sets, data mining, or natural language processing are complex and may leave legal intuitions behind. It will be helpful for students to gain an introduction to thinking computationally with
algorithms that model reasoning processes with which they have become familiar by the end of the first year of law school.
The progression also makes sense in another way. As argued below, the computational models of legal reasoning ultimately will lead
the way for improving the intelligent behavior of the Digital Documents Technologies. At least some law students taking the Al and Law
seminar may be well positioned to design those techniques themselves
or to support others in designing them.
Even if the law students become only consumers or users of the
Digital Documents Technologies, rather than designers or improvers of
them, it is valuable for non-programming law students to learn some-
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thing about how these tools work. Corporate and governmental clients
will soon demand e-discovery tools, and these tools will not only be
permitted, but required by the professional standard of care. The process of accepting these tools into the profession has been, and will continue to be, performed by attorneys-former law students-selecting
the tools, using them, directing others how to use them, interpreting
their outputs and justifying their use to others (such as judges) by explaining how they work and how reliable and effective they are. The Al
and Law Seminar prepares future attorneys for these tasks by teaching
them some valuable lessons about legal Digital Documents Technologies.
VI.

LESSONS ABOUT LEGAL DIGITAL DOCUMENTS TECHNOLOGIES

This section highlights some of the lessons about Digital Documents Technologies students can learn from the AI and Law seminar.
Lesson D1: Legal DigitalDocuments Technologies are based on process models and algorithms.As noted above, the move from customized

to commoditized legal services means that law students can benefit
from an understanding of the concept of a "process involving legal
knowledge."
The AI and Law seminar exposes law students to the notion of
such processes by example. All of the computational models discussed
in the Syllabus focus on processing legal knowledge. This is true of the
Al and Law reasoning models as well as the Digital Documents Technologies models.
A number of the AI and Law models are especially well-developed
representations of processes involving legal knowledge and algorithmic implementations of the processes or parts of them. For instance,
the CABARET program applies an agenda mechanism to switch control
between rule-based and case-based reasoning as the need arises.121

Students can inspect the output of the process to compare CABARET's
control mechanism with that of human problem solvers, who, probably, switch less frequently and are more focused on identifying issues
and resolving them. The IBP+SMILE program reifies a process of predicting legal outcomes with past cases. The IBP component breaks a
problem into issues, and for each issue, poses a hypothesis about who
should win based on cases indexed by factors pertaining to that issue.
Then the program tests the hypothesis for counterexamples that it
121. Rissland &Skalak, supra note 33, at 853.
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cannot explain away.122 The SMILE component employs machine
learning to learn how to identify the factors in textual descriptions of
cases. In the combined program, an algorithm employs SMILE to process a problem input as text and outputs a list of applicable factors to
IBP, which then predicts an outcome.123
Other Syllabus research papers provide good examples of processes involving machine learning and automatically extracting information from texts, including statutory texts,124 case textS,125 and texts
involved in pre-trial discovery.126 The work by Francesconi and colleagues illustrates a nice integration of bottom-up and top-down processing to focus human annotators on statistically interesting features
that may deserve manual inclusion in an ontology.127
An existing Digital Documents Technology for pretrial ediscoveryl28 implements an iterative process for identifying documents relevant to a lawsuit. The authors focus on senior litigators'
"sensemaking": the "process of collecting, organizing and creating representations of complex information sets [i.e, the e-documents], all
centered around some problem they need to understand [i.e., how they
relate to the litigation]."129 The goal is to tease out the litigators' relevance hypotheses: more-or-less abstract descriptions of subject matter
that, if found in a document, would make that document relevant to the
law suit.13o The paper describes an iterative user modeling process to
elicit these relevance hypotheses. It is a computer-mediated process of
successive refinement in which the litigator communicates the information needed, sample documents are retrieved, and the litigator confirms whether they are responsive. If they are not responsive, the
litigator refines the hypothesis. This process yields a model of the litigator's objectives, the legal and other concepts relevant to the case and
their level of specificity, and the variety of ways of expressing the concept. This information, in effect, operationalizes the litigator's hypothe122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
making:

Ashley & Bruininghaus, Computer Models, supra note 30, at 347.
Ashley & Briininghaus,AutomaticallyClassifying Case Texts, supra note 58, at 139-40.
Francesconi & Passerini, supra note 59; de Maat et al., supra note 59.
Jackson et al., supra note 52.
Privault et al., supra note 65.
Francesconi et al., supra note 48.
Hogan et al., supra note 64, at 434-35.
Robert Bauer, Teresa Jade, Bruce Hedin & Christopher Hogan, Automated Legal SenseThe Centrality of Relevance and Intentionality,2008 PROC. OF THE SECOND INT'L WORKSHOP

ON SUPPORTING SEARCH & SENSEMAKING FOR ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFO. IN DISCOVERY SESSION 2,

Paper No. 5, 2, availableat http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/9131/1/9131.pdf.
130. Hogan et al., supra note 64, at 446-48, 455.
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sis and is then used to retrieve more documents relevant to that hypothesis. As machine learning develops a probabilistic model of concepts of interest, tools can help litigators visualize how closely new
documents relate to the conceptual clusters of relevant document.131
Over the years, in writing papers for the Al and Law Seminar at
the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, students have developed
their own representations of processes involving legal knowledge.
Some representative titles include:
* "Artificial Intelligence Applications in Prior Art Searches: An
Overview and Forecast for the Patent Literature Search Industry"
* "Al Improvements to Gene Patent Application Processing"
* "For the Truth of the Story Asserted: Using Al to Assist Juries in Coherent Reconstruction of Facts at Trial"
* "Adapting Al and Law Models to Predict Litigation Outcomes
by Normalizing Against a Null-Rule"
Lesson D2: Processes underlying legal DigitalDocuments Technologies involve different kinds of texts as inputs. The processes underlying
the Digital Documents Technologies involve texts as inputs; students in
the Al and Law Seminar can thus learn about the challenges of computationally dealing with texts.
Most of the computational models of legal reasoning cited in the
Syllabus do not accept texts as inputs. Instead, a human reads the texts
of a problem scenario or of the cases to be stored in the program's
knowledge base, extracts the information called for by the program
and manually represents the problem or cases in the appropriate formats. Thus, the inputs are, in a sense, manually-processed texts. The
main exception is the IBP+SMILE program described above.
In the processes and domains of the Digital Documents Technologies, too many documents exist to process each one manually. Legal IR
providers like Lexis and Westlaw acquire thousands of cases per day.
The case texts are submitted electronically by the courts, and indexed
automatically in an inverted index, in which a given document is indexed by every "major" word (that is, with stop words like "the," "a,"
"an," et cetera, filtered out of the indexing terms). Thus, legal IR programs search millions of documents in response to a query; the Al and
Law models search at most hundreds (but some, like SPIRE,132 do connect to full-text legal IR sources, thus expanding their searches).
131. Privault et al., supra note 65.
132. Daniels & Rissland, supra note 53.
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The models also deal with very different kinds of texts. Some of
the legal text processing research deals with more structured texts
whose functions in a process of legal administration are known (such
as statutory texts or the texts of a court decision). In the e-discovery
context, by comparison, the texts are extremely heterogeneous documents produced in litigation. They include not only corporate memoranda and agreements, but also the full range of internet-based
communications, including emails. The emails may be from managers
to and from employees, or from employees to other employees, customers and suppliers, or to employees' families and friends, et cetera.
In fact, for emails, a social network analysis of who is communicating
with whom over what time frame may provide valuable information
for selecting relevant texts for further analysis.133
Lesson D3: DigitalDocuments Technologiesfind texts relevant to legal problems. Digital Documents Technologies tend to focus on a process of finding information relevant to legal problems. This process
affects the way in which such a system assesses relevance, the way the
system is evaluated, and the measures used to assess its performance.
Law students will find that IR relevance, evaluation, and measures are
defined succinctly in the Syllabus materials on e-discovery:
Relevance: In IR tasks, "[a] correctly returned document (broadly
conceived as any container of information) is considered relevant if
the user would wish to see it, and not relevant otherwise....."
Evaluation: "An important consequence of relevance being an opinion (rather than an objectively determinable fact) is that retrieval effectiveness is a principal focus for evaluation.... [T]he vast majority
of IR evaluation is concerned principally with just one aspect of relevance: topicality.... [T]he most widely used definition of topical relevance by IR researchers is substantive treatment of the desired
topic by any part of the document."
Measures: "The effectiveness of a retrieval approach is then measured by its ability to retrieve, for each topic, those documents which
have positive assessments for that topic. Assuming binary (i.e., relevant vs. non-relevant) assessments, two measures of effectiveness
are very commonly reported. Recall is the proportion of the extant
relevant documents that were retrieved by the system, while precision is the proportion of retrieved documents which were in fact relevant. Together they reflect a user-centered view of the fundamental
tradeoff between false positives and false negatives."134
Topicality in a legal context is a moving target. Although the
Westlaw key numbering system provides a rich list of topics spanning
133. Henseler, supra note 63.
134. Oard et al., supra note 61, at 360, 362, 363 (emphasis in original).
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legal subject matter, attorneys often seek more detailed topics. Attorneys seek to capture factual patterns in the targeted cases that are relevant to the problem situation (that is, the source case) they are reresearching. In e-discovery, no such list exists. The topics of relevance
are the abstract descriptions known primarily to the litigator; indeed,
as described above, providers of Digital Documents Technology need
to develop special processes to induce the topics based on litigators'
determinations of the relevance of documents.
The Syllabus materials provide law students with a readable account of how full text legal information retrieval systems like Westlaw
and Lexis use probabilities based on frequencies of terms in documents and in the corpus to model the topic a user deems important
(that is, the user's information need). Moreover, these materials explain how information retrieval systems estimate documents' relevance to the user's information need, achieving high precision in a
context in which recall usually is of somewhat secondary importance.135 This system works well in legal research where an exhaustive search for every relevant case is rarely necessary; a handful of
good cases are enough to develop an understanding of the issue and to
formulate an argument on how to decide it.136
In e-discovery, however, retrieving "any and all" documents pertaining to a topic is the typical goal.137 That is, there is a premium on
recall. This fact is unfortunate for two reasons. First, research shows
that attorneys tend to overestimate their rates of recall.138
That [seminal] study established a gap between the perception on
the part of lawyers that using their specific queries they would retrieve on the order of 75% of the relevant evidence to be found in a
collection of 40,000 documents gathered for litigation purposes,
whereas the researchers were able to show that only about 20% of
relevant documents had in fact been found.139
Second, "[iut is now well understood that as data sets get larger,
high-precision searches generally become somewhat easier, but "indeterminacy multiplies making it increasingly difficult to conduct successful specific or exhaustive searches."140

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Turtle, supra note 49, at 7-9.
Oard et al., supra note 61, at 353.
Id. at 351.
Blair & Maron, supra note 51, at 293-94.
Oard et al., supra note 61, at 348-49.
Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
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These factors have consequences for legal practitioners, who as
noted above, are responsible for understanding, selecting, interpreting,
and justifying e-discovery processes and tools, a daunting task given
the welter of vendors' alternative products and conflicting claims and
the dearth of objective evaluations.

Lesson D4: DigitalDocuments Technologies and their process models need empirical methodologiesfor testing. For law students who increasingly face the need to deal with models of legal information proprocesses, either as consumers or designers, the Al and Law Seminar
teaches an empirical methodology for testing process models. The history of progress in Al and Law has been marked by testing the models
empirically or in thought experiments, focusing on examples where the
model breaks down and then adapting it. This history includes the invention of experimental techniques for evaluating the modelS.141 The
progression of work from Berman's and Hafner's first call for representing the teleological underpinnings of case-based reasoning,142 to
CATO's Factor Hierarchy,143 to hypothesis-testing in IBP,144 to theoryinduction,145 to argument schemes,146 to the value judgment model,147
is an instance of example-driven incremental and continuing refinement of a legal information process model. Another example is the
iterative refinement in models of hypothetical reasoning.148
The Syllabus provides a treatment of the challenges of and methods for objectively evaluating e-discovery IR tools.149 It introduces
students to the TREC Legal Track, in which teams from academia and
industry vie annually to field and evaluate the most effective ediscovery IR tools applied to publicly available datasets. Publicly available datasets include the collections of emails and other documents in
the Tobacco litigation and the Enron scandal. The requirements of the
TREC competition, namely the increased numbers of e-documents and
the need to compare entries in terms of three aspects of system effectiveness for realistic discovery, have driven the TREC organizers to

141. See, e.g., Branting, supra note 26; Ashley & Bruninghaus, Computer Models, supra note 30;
McLaren, supra note 36.
142. Berman & Hafner, supra note 34.
143. See Aleven, supra note 29, at 191-93.
144. See Ashley & BrUninghaus, Computer Models, supra note 30.
145. Bench-Capon & Sartor, supra note 35.
146. Gordon & Walton, supra note 38; Atkinson & Bench-Capon, supra note 37.
147. Grabmair & Ashley, supra note 39.
148. See supra note 100.
149. Oard et al., supra note 61.
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extend the experimental techniques of the Blair and Maron studyiso
into large scale evaluations employing many law students, paralegals,
and lawyers as volunteer relevance assessors.151
As potential consumers of this technology, it is useful for law students to learn that the e-discovery task is not monolithic. While there
are three aspects to the TREC competition, all focus on "responsive
review: ... in which a party... is served... with a request for production of documents and,... must find and produce... any and all docu-

ments that are responsive to the request."152 The specific three aspects
focused on are:
1. Interactive task (i.e., retrieving all and only the documents
consistent with a topic authority's definition of what is relevant);153

2. Ad Hoc task (i.e., a single pass, first-pass automatic
search);154 and

3. Relevance Feedback task (i.e., a second pass search based on
human feedback on first-pass results).155
As the OARD article makes clear, the techniques for evaluating the
three tasks differ, and there are other tasks for which the evaluation
techniques have yet to be invented.156
Armed with a conceptual understanding of IR relevance, evaluation, and measures as they are applied to e-discovery and an empirical
and example-based methodology for testing claims about process
models, students will be well-prepared to critically question vendors'
claims regarding e-discovery tools, to use the tools effectively in their
own e-discovery processes, and to justify the tools to clients and judges.
Lesson D5: Finding texts relevant to legal problems is different from
applying relevant texts to solve legal problems. Having studied some
Digital Documents Technologies, as well as some computational mod-

150. Blair & Maron, supra note 51.
151. Oard et al., supra note 61, at 367.
152. Id. at 370.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 373.
155. Id. at 375.
156. Id. at 370. "Early in the lawsuit, an attorney may conduct exploratory searches of a document collection in order to test hypotheses and to build a theory of the case; further along, an
attorney may search for documents relevant to the activities of a particular individual in order to
prepare for the deposition of a witness; as trial approaches, an attorney may search through the
set of generally relevant documents in order to find the small subset that he or she would like to
enter as exhibits in trial; and so on."
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els of legal reasoning, students will be in a good position to consider
how the two approaches might be integrated.
Why might such integration be worthwhile? If the history of the
legal services market has indeed progressed from customization
through standardization, systematization, and packaging, to commoditization, what, one may ask, comes next? As efficient as it may be to
produce, commoditized legal work is no longer customized to solve a
client's particular problem. While it may be too expensive to employ
human attorneys to adapt the commoditized product to solve the client's problem, computational techniques may yet perform such "postcommoditization" customization efficiently.
As noted above, the Digital Documents Technologies tend to focus
on a process of finding information relevant to legal problems. By contrast, the computational models of legal reasoning tend to focus on a
process of applying relevant information to solve legal problems. As a
result, the two approaches have complementary advantages and disadvantages.
The measure of relevance in information retrieval (that is, the statistical probability that a document substantively treats the desired
topic) is remarkably effective and requires no special document representation; the documents are texts in an inverted index. On the other
hand, only a human can use the documents so retrieved to solve a legal
problem by, say, incorporating the information contained within the
document into a legal argument. The computational models of legal
reasoning, on the other hand, employ relevance measures, like those in
Table 1, and can use the retrieved information to solve a legal problem
by generating an argument. One downside, however, is that these relevance measures can only work if the cases are specially represented in
terms of dimensions, factors, critical facts, et cetera. And, with the exception of efforts like SPIRE1s7 or SMILE+1BPls8, a program cannot fill
out the special representations automatically.
Nevertheless, one begins to see programs that are bridging the
gap between Digital Documents Technologies and computational models of legal reasoning.
Lesson D6: Computationalmodels of legal reasoningcan be a bridge
between legal texts and legal problem solving. Some existing and current work in AI and Law employs computational models of legal rea-

157. Daniels & Rissiand, supra note 53.
158. See Ashley & Brininghaus, Automatically Classifying Case Texts, supra note 58.
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soning and argument as a bridge between legal texts and the answers
and arguments humans seek.
The SPIRE program, for example, demonstrated how to use a factor-based computational model of a bankruptcy law issue (like whether a bankruptcy plan has been submitted in good faith) to seed queries
into a full-text legal information retrieval system. The program used
the Hypo-style computational model to find the most relevant cases for
solving a legal problem and used these cases to seed a query; in effect,
instructing the full-text IR system to retrieve more similar texts.159 In
experiments, SPIRE found new relevant cases very similar to the inputted problems (for example, involving the same kind of legal stories). A SPIRE user could also indicate the particular features of
interest, and the program would automatically highlight the parts of
the text of the retrieved cases that correspond to that feature.
Other examples involve applying pattern matchingl6o and machine learning techniques to categorize statutory provision texts in
terms of their broad regulatory functions (e.g., as a definition, liability,
prohibition, duty, permission, or penalty). These techniques can then
be used to extract typical features associated with each function.161 For
instance, the provision, "A controller intending to process personal
data falling within the scope of application of this Act shall have to notify the Guarantor thereof," is classified as "duty" with the associated
features: Bearer (of the duty) = "controller", Action = "notification",
Counterpart = "Guarantor", and Object = "process personal data". The
aim of learning classifiers and features of statutory provisions in this
work is to extract legal rules directly from legislative texts. Ultimately,
a program could reason with formalized rules so extracted. As of yet,
no reported work has succeeded in extracting legal rules from the
statutory texts for this purpose. However, in the meantime, the information extracted could be mapped into comprehensive conceptual
indices (like legal thesauri, dictionaries, or ontologies) and used to
support more focused conceptual queries for all legal rules relevant to
particular business compliance issues, for example.
Other work involves annotating legal decision texts in a way that
connects them to trees of rule-based inferences so that a program can
learn to reason about previously unseen texts. For instance, efforts are
aimed at integrating NLP techniques employed in the IBM Watson
159. Id. at 131-32.
160. de Maat et al., supra note 59.
161. Francesconi et al., supra note 48.
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question-answering projectl62 with defeasible logic models that represent statutory and regulatory requirements as trees of rule conditions
linked to chains of reasoning in the legal decisions that connect the
evidentiary input to the findings of fact.163 A proposition of interest
(for example, that a statutory provision has been satisfied) is thus decomposed into an inference tree consisting of legal propositions and
related factual assertions whose expressions can be annotated in the
natural language texts of legal decisions. This use increases the granularity of the legal concepts to the point where they can be linked closely to common sense reasoning about facts and used to facilitate more
effective searching, extraction, and reporting. For example, although
high-level legal concepts (such as "entitled to compensation") would
pose a vague retrieval task, lower-level concepts into which they are
decomposed (such as "medical condition," or "time of onset") would be
more amenable to automated search and reasoning about new texts.
Given a sufficient number of annotated decisions, machine learning and natural language processing can be applied so that a program
can learn to identify the annotated patterns in new texts it has not yet
seen, just as IBM's Watson program did in a question answering context. As noted above, in at least one law school lab setting, law students
are engaged in the process of annotating statutory and evidentiary
arguments in legal decisions.164 In so doing, these students are learning a comprehensive model of legal reasoning and encountering all of
the lessons recited above-lessons about legal rules, cases, arguments,
Digital Documents Technologies, and the process engineering that
connects them.
Apart from Digital Documents Technologies, Al and Law process
models are being developed in a variety of areas. The INDiGO project
and work by Governatoris65 are based on meticulous representation of
regulatory, administrative, and business processes and careful consideration of how Al expert systems can be integrated into those processes to assist humans. In the INDiGO project, for example, the processes
in focus include not only applying regulations, but also improving them
in light of experience. An expert system assists immigration agents in
the Netherlands with processing clients in accordance with voluminous regulatory provisions. At the same time, the system collects feed162.
163.
164.
165.

Ferrucci et al., supra note 66, at 67.
Ashley & Walker, supra note 67.
See Law, Logic & Technology Research Laboratory, supra note 16.
Governatori & Shek, supra note 70; Theunisz, supra note 72.
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back and data about problems arising under the regulations to pass
along to regulators and rule modelers concerning the aspects of the
rules that need to be improved. Legal process engineering can be expected to grow, offering opportunities to law students who understand
its potential.
CONCLUSION

This article has presented a sample syllabus for an Al and Law
Seminar to teach law and legal practice in a digital age. The discussion
has drawn out four sets of pedagogical lessons implicit in the material.
The Al and Law Seminar not only teaches students valuable pedagogical lessons about legal rules, cases and arguments, but also introduces
them to process models and algorithms for legal practice in a digital
age. In this respect, the Seminar makes a timely contribution to the law
students' education and addresses the current exigency facing law
schools in uncertain times for the legal profession.
AI and Law models of legal reasoning and legal text processing
add value to real world applications, including e-discovery, visualizing
legal arguments, predicting outcomes, making settlement decisions,
and legal expert systems. Law students can contribute to this technology as informed users and also as annotators, designers, and inventors
of new models.
With the benefit of these lessons, law students would be ideally
prepared to apply them in some practical context. For instance, an Al
and Law practicum in the subsequent semester could serve as a kind of
laboratory course.166 Law students could build their own legal expert
system using the tools described above or explore how such tools
could be extended to accommodate missing features of legal reasoning.
These missing features include: reasoning with cases and dealing with
uncertainty;167 experimenting with applying predictive coding to publicly available e-discovery datasets;168 participating in the Trec Legal
Track as volunteer relevance assessors;169 and participating in diagramming arguments and annotating legal documents according to a
computational model of legal argument so that machine learning tools
can be applied.170
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra Section III.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Some of those law students may even contribute new computational models and new approaches to knowledge representation as Al
and Law researchers turn to the challenges of modeling legal planning
and creative legal problem solving.
APPENDIX

Sample Syllabus for Al and Law Seminar
PartOne: ComputationalModels of Reasoning with Legal Rules and
Cases

I. Introduction to Computational Models of Legal Reasoning
* Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping
Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L. J. 1957
(1990).
*

DONALD A. WATERMAN & MARK A. PETERSON, MODELS OF LEGAL

DECISIONMAKING (1981).
*

ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

APPROACH To LEGAL REASONING (1987).

*
*

II. Logical Models of Statutory Reasoning
Marek J. Sergot, Fariba Sadri, Robert A. Kowalski, Frank
Kriwaczek, P. Hammond & H.T.Cory, The British Nationality

Act as a Logic Program,29 COMM. OF THE ACM 370 (1986).
Trevor Bench-Capon & Franz Coenen, Exploiting Isomorphism: Development of a KBS to Support British Coal Insurance Claims, 1991 PROC. OF THE THIRD INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL

INTELLIGENCE & L. 62.

*

*

Layman E.Allen & C.Rudy Engholm, Normalized Legal Drafting and the Query Method, 29 J. LEGAL EDuc. 380 (19771978).
Donald Berman & Carole Hafner, Obstacles to the Development of Logic-Based Models of Legal Reasoning, in COMPUTER
POWER AND LEGAL LANGUAGE 183-214 (Charles Walter ed.,

1986).

III. Case-Based Models of Legal Reasoning
*

L.Thorne McCarty, An Implementation of Eisner v. Macomber, 1995 PROC. OF THE FIFTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 276.

*

Kevin D. Ashley, Reasoning with Cases and Hypotheticals in
HYPO, 34 INT'L J.OF MAN-MACH. STUD. 753 (1991).
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L. Karl Branting, Building Explanationsfrom Rules and Structured Cases, 34 INT'L J.OF MAN-MACH. STUD. 797 (1991).
IV. Models for Predicting Legal Outcomes

*

Vincent Aleven, Using Background Knowledge in CaseBased Legal Reasoning: A Computational Model and an InARTIFICIAL
telligent Learning Environment, 150
INTELLIGENCE 183 (2003).

*

Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Bruininghaus, Computer Models
for Legal Prediction,46 JURIMETRICS 309 (2006).

V.Models Integrating Cases, Statutes, Rules, Concepts, and Values
*
*

Edwina L.Rissland & David B. Skalak, CABARET: Statutory
Interpretation in a Hybrid Architecture, 34 INT'L J.OF MANMACH. STUD. 839 (1991).
Donald H.Berman & Carol Hafner, Representing Teleological
Structure in Case-Based Legal Reasoning: The Missing Link,
1993 PROC. OF THE FOURTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 50.

*
*

Trevor Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor, A Model of Legal
Reasoning with Cases IncorporatingTheories and Values, 150
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 97 (2003).
Bruce M.McLaren, Extensionally Defining Principlesand Cases in Ethics: An Al Model, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 145
(2003).

PartTwo: Defeasible Legal Reasoning with Argument Schemes

VI. Assessing Legal Claims with Argument Schema
*
*
*

*

Thomas F. Gordon & Douglas Walton, Legal Reasoning with
Argumentation Schemes, 2009 PROC. OF THE TWELFTH INT'L
CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE &L. 137.
Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon, Argumentation and
Standardsof Proof 2007 PROC. OF THE ELEVENTH INT'L CONF. ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE &L. 107.
Matthias Grabmair &Kevin D.Ashley, FacilitatingCase Comparison Using Value judgments and Intermediate Legal Concepts, 2011 PROC. OF THE THIRTEENTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE &L. 161.
Vern R. Walker, Nathaniel Carie, Courtney C.DeWitt & Eric
Lesh, A Frameworkfor the Extraction and Modeling of FactFinding Reasoning from Legal Decisions: Lessons from the
Vaccine/Injury ProjectCorpus, 19 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L.
291 (2011).
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VII. Representing Legal Concepts and Case Knowledge in Ontologies
*

Kevin D.Ashley &Stefanie Brininghaus, A PredictiveRole for
Intermediate Legal Concepts, PROC. OF THE SIXTEENTH ANN.
CONF. ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFo. SYS. 153 (2003).

*

Kevin D. Ashley, Ontological Requirements for Analogical,

Teleological, and Hypothetical Legal Reasoning, 2009 PROC.

OF THE TWELFTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 1.

*

Trevor J.M. Bench-Capon & Peppin R.S. Visser, Ontologies in

Legal Information Systems; The Need for Explicit Specifications of Domain Conceptualisations,1997 PROC. OF THE SIXTH
*

INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 132.
Joost Breuker, Andre Valente & Radboud Winkels, Legal On-

tologies in Knowledge Engineering and Information Management, 12 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 241 (2004).

*

Enrico Francesconi, Simonetta Montemagni, Wim Peters &
Daniela Tiscornia, Integrating a Bottom-Up and Top-Down

Methodology for Building Semantic Resourcesfor the Multilingual Legal Domain, in SEMANTIC PROCESSING OF LEGAL TEXTS:

WHERE THE LANGUAGE OF LAW MEETS THE LAW OF LANGUAGE 95
(Enrico Francesconi, Simonetta Montemagni, Wim Peters &

Daniela Tiscornia eds., 2010).
Part Three: Legal Information Retrieval,Information Extraction,and
Text Processing

VIII. How Full-Text Legal Information Retrieval Works
*

Howard Turtle, Text Retrieval in the Legal World, 3
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 5 (1995).

*

David C.Blair & M. E. Maron, An Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for a Full-Text Document-Retrieval System, 28
COMM. OF THE ACM 289 (1985).

*

Eugene Charniak, Bayesian Networks Without Tears, 12 Al
MAGAZINE, Winter 1991, at 50.

IX.Combining Legal IR and AI to Analyze Legal Claims
*

Jody J. Daniels & Edwina L. Rissland, Finding Legally Relevant Passagesin Case Opinions, 1997 PROC. OF THE SIXTH INT'L
CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 39.

*

M. Saravanan, B. Ravindran & S. Raman, Improving Legal In-

formation Retrieval Using an Ontological Framework, 17
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 101 (2009).

*

Peter Jackson, Khalid Al-Kofahi, Alex Tyrrell & Arun
Vachher, Information Extractionfrom Case Law and Retrieval
ofPriorCases, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 239 (2003).
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Edwina L. Rissland & M. Timur Friedman, Detecting Change
in Legal Concepts, 1995 PROC. OF THE FIFTH INT'L CONF. ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 127.
Daniel E. Rose & Richard K.Belew, A Connectionistand Symbolic Hybridfor Improving Legal Research, 35 INT'L J.OF MANMACH. STUD. 1 (1991).

*

Edwina Rissland, David Skalak & Timur Friedman, BankXXSupporting Legal Arguments through Heuristic Retrieval, 4
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 1 (1996).

X.Legal Information Extraction and Text Processing
*

*

*

Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Brininghaus, Automatically Classifying Case Texts and Predicting Outcomes, 17 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 125 (2009).
Enrico Francesconi & Andrea Passerini, Automatic Classification of Provisions in Legislative Texts, 15 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE &L. 1 (2007).
Emile de Maat, Kai Krabben & Radboud Winkels, Machine
Learning Versus Knowledge Based Classification of Legal
Texts, 2010 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANN. CONF. ON LEGAL
KNOWLEDGE & INFO. Sys. 87.

XI. Al and Law Tools for E-Discovery: Obtaining Evidence Relevant
to Lawyers' Hypotheses about Claims and Documents
*

*

*

*

*

Kevin Ashley & Will Bridewell, Emerging Al & Law Approaches to Automating Analysis and Retrieval of Electronically Stored Information in Discovery Proceedings, 18
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 311 (2010).
Douglas W. Oard, Jason R. Baron, Bruce Hedin, David D. Lewis & Stephen Tomlinson, Evaluation of information Retrieval
for E-discovery, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 347 (2010).
Hans Henseler, Network-based Filtering for Large Email Collections in E-Discovery, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 413
(2010).
Christopher Hogan, Robert S. Bauer & Daniel Brassil, Automation of Legal Sensemaking in E-discovery, 18 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 431 (2010).
Caroline Privault, Jacki O'Neill, Victor Ciriza & Jean-Michel
Renders, A New Tangible User Interface for Machine Learning Document Review, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 459

*

(2010).
David D. Lewis, Afterword:

Data, Knowledge, and E-

discovery, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 481 (2010).

DIGITAL AGE LEGAL PRACTICE

20131

843

PartFour: The Future ofAl and Law: Bridging ComputationalModels
and Legal Texts

XII. Near Term Developments in Al and Law
*

David Ferrucci, Eric Brown, Jennifer Chu-Carroll, James Fan,
David Gondek, Aditya A. Kalyanpur, Adam Lally, 1. William
Murdock, Eric Nyberg, John Prager, Nico Schlaefer & Chris
Welty, Building Watson: An Overview of the DeepQA Project,
31 Al MAGAZINE, Fall 2010, at 59.

*

*

Kevin D. Ashley & Vern R. Walker, Automated Monitoring of
Legal-Rule Compliance Using DeepQA: Screening Legal Documents for Argumentation Evidence, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
Guido Governatori & Sidney Shek, Rule Based Business Process Compliance, 874 PROC. OF THE RULEML2012@ECAI
CHALLENGE, AT THE SIXTH INT'L SYMP. ON RULES Paper No. 5

*

(2012),
available
at
http://ceur-ws.org/Vol874/paperl7.pdf.
Matthias Grabmair & Kevin D.Ashley, A Survey of Uncertainties

and

their Consequences, in

ARGUMENTATION

*

*

IN BAYESIAN

PROBABILISTIC

ARGUMENTATION

61

LEGAL
(Frank

Zenker ed., 2012).
Audrey Theunisz, INDiGO: Rules-driven Business Services;
Flexibility Within the Boundaries of the Law, Presentation of
the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Oct. 5,
2010),
available
athttp://www.servicetechsymposium.com/soa-archive/pdf
berlin/AudreyTheuniszRulesDriven.pdf. (In the absence
of a published paper in English on INDiGO, this seems to be
the most informative document publicly available.)
Benjamin N. Grosof, Yannis Labrou & Hoi Y.Chan, A Declarative Approach to Business Rules in Contracts:Courteous Logic
Programs in XML, 1999 PROC. OF THE FIRST ACM CONF. ON
ELECTRONIC COM.

Addenda

XIII. Intelligent Tutoring Systems in Law and Ethical Reasoning
*

Vincent Aleven, Using Background Knowledge in Case-Based
Legal Reasoning: A Computational Model and an Intelligent
Learning Environment, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 183

*

(2003).
Chad S. Carr, Using Computer Supported Argument Visualization

to

Teach

ARGUMENTATION:

Legal

SOFTWARE

Argumentation,

in

VISUALIZING

TOOLS FOR COLLABORATIVE

AND

EDUCATIONAL SENSE-MAKING 75 (Paul A. Kirschner, Simon

Buckingham Shum & Chad S. Carr, eds., 2003).

J.
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Kevin D. Ashley, Teaching a Process Model of Legal Argument with Hypotheticals, 17 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE &L. 321
(2009).
Antoinette J.Muntjewerff, ICT in Legal Education, 10 GER. L.
J.669 (2009).
Kevin Ashley & Ilya Goldin, Toward Al-enhanced Computersupported Peer Review in Legal Education, 2011 PROC. OF
THE TWENTY-FOURTH ANN. CONF. ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFO.

SYs. 1.

*

Collin Lynch, Kevin D.Ashley & Mohammad H. Falakmasir,
Comparing Argument Diagrams, 2012 PROC. OF THE TWENTYFIFTH ANN. CONF. ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFO. Sys.

81.

XIV. Legal and Ethical Issues Related to AI and Law Programs
*
*

*
*

Samir Chopra & Laurence White, A Legal Theory For Autonomous Artificial Agents 119 (2011).
Taiwo A. Oriola, The Use of Legal Software by Non-Lawyers
and the Perils of UnauthorisedPracticeof Law Charges in the
United States: A Review ofjayson Reynoso Decision, 18 Artificial Intelligence & L.285 (2010).
Emad A. R. Dahiyat, Intelligent Agents and Liability: Is It a
Doctrinal Problem or Merely A Problem of Explanation?, 18
Artificial Intelligence &L. 103 (2010).
Woodrow Barfield, IntellectualProperty Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers
and VirtualAvatars,39 Akron L.Rev. 649 (2006).

